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THE VIRTUES OF MODERATION 
James Grimmelmann 
 




TL;DR—On a Friday in 2005, the Los Angeles Times 
launched an experiment: a “wikitorial” on the Iraq War that any 
of the paper’s readers could edit. By Sunday, the experiment 
had ended in abject failure: vandals overran it with crude pro-
fanity and graphic pornography. The wikitorial took its inspira-
tion and its technology from Wikipedia, but missed something 
essential about how the “the free encyclopedia that anyone can 
edit” staves off abuse while maintaining its core commitment to 
open participation. 
The difference is moderation: the governance mechanisms 
that structure participation in a community to facilitate cooper-
ation and prevent abuse. Town meetings have moderators, and 
so do online communities. A community’s moderators can pro-
mote posts or hide them, honor posters or shame them, recruit 
users or ban them. Their decisions influence what is seen, what 
is valued, what is said. They create the conditions under which 
cooperation is possible. 
This Article provides a novel taxonomy of moderation in 
online communities. It breaks down the basic verbs of modera-
tion—exclusion, pricing, organizing, and norm-setting—and 
shows how they help communities walk the tightrope between 
the chaos of too much freedom and the sterility of too much con-
trol. Scholars studying the commons can learn from modera-
tion, and so can policy-makers debating the regulation of online 
communities.  
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Law. My thanks for their comments to Aislinn Black, BJ Ard, Jack Bal-
kin, Shyam Balganesh, Nicholas Bramble, Danielle Citron, Anne Huang, 
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ference, and the 2014 Free Expression Scholars Conference. This Article 
may be freely reused under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International license, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0. 
Attribution under the license should take the form “James Grimmelmann, 
The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42 (2015)” or its equiva-
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Building a community is pretty tough; it re-
quires just the right combination of technol-
ogy and rules and people. And while it’s been 
clear that communities are at the core of 
many of the most interesting things on the In-
ternet, we’re still at the very early stages of un-
derstanding what it is that makes them work. 
    –Aaron Swartz1 
INTRODUCTION 
If you’ve never seen the image known as “goatse,” trust 
me—you don’t want to.2 But if you have, you understand why it 
was such a disaster when this notoriously disgusting photo-
graph showed up on the website of the Los Angeles Times on 
June 19, 2005.3 It wasn’t a hack. The newspaper had invited its 
readers to post whatever they wanted. One of them posted a 
gaping anus. 
It had started off innocently enough. Inspired by Wikipedia, 
the Times launched a “wikitorial,” an editorial that any of the 
paper’s readers could edit.4 At first, readers fought over its po-
sition: should it be for or against the Iraq War?5 Then one 
boiled the argument down to its essence—“Fuck USA”—
touching off an edit war of increasingly rapid and radically in-
compatible changes.6 By the second day, trolls were posting 
hardcore pornography, designed to shock and disgust.7 The 
Times pulled the plug entirely in less than forty-eight hours.8 
What had started with “Rewrite the editorial yourself”9 ended 
                                                
1  Aaron Swartz, Making More Wikipedias, RAW THOUGHT (Sept. 14, 2006), 
http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/morewikipedias [http://perma.cc/U2LR-C 
DTB].  
2 The image, which has circulated on the Internet since 1999, depicts a man 
exposing himself to the camera in a particularly graphic and unpleasant 
way. In its heyday, goatse was most often used for its shock value: direct 
people to a website containing it, and revel in their horror. See Adrian 
Chen, Finding Goatse: The Mystery Man Behind the Most Disturbing In-
ternet Meme in History, GAWKER, Apr. 10, 2012, http://gawker.com/finding-
goatse-the-mystery-man-behind-the-most-disturb-5899787 
[http://perma.cc/6RJ8-WVAW]. 
3  See, e.g., Dan Glaister, LA Times ‘Wikitorial’ Gives Editors Red Face, THE 
GUARDIAN, June 21, 2005, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2005 
/jun/22/media.pressandpublishing [http://perma.cc/NY5A-3A83]. 
4  A Wiki for Your Thoughts, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2005, http://www.latimes 
.com/news/la-ed-wiki17jun17-story.html [http://perma.cc/4QW8-RH7C]. 
5  Glaister, supra note 3. 
6  Id. 
7  Id. 
8  James Rainey, ‘Wikitorial’ Pulled Due to Vandalism, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 
2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/21/nation/na-wiki21 [http://perm 
a.cc/TJ2J-AD7S]. 
9 A Wiki for Your Thoughts, supra note 4.  
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with the admission that “a few readers were flooding the site 
with inappropriate material.”10 
The wikitorial debacle has the air of a parable: the Los An-
geles Times hung a “KICK ME” sign on its website, and of 
course it got kicked. Open up an online community, and of 
course you’ll bring out the spammers, the vandals, and the 
trolls. That’s just how people act on the Internet. But consider 
this: the Times’ model, Wikipedia, is going into its thirteenth 
year.11 It is the sixth most-visited website on the Internet.12 
And despite being a website “that anyone can edit,” it remains 
almost entirely goatse-free.13 Anarchy on the Internet is not 
inevitable. Spaces can and do flourish where people collaborate 
and where all are welcome. What, then, separates the Wikipe-
dias from the wikitorials? Why do some communities thrive 
while others become ghost towns? 
The difference is moderation. Just as town meetings and 
debates have moderators who keep the discussion civil and 
productive,14 healthy online communities have moderators who 
facilitate communication. A community’s moderators can pro-
mote posts or hide them, honor posters or shame them, recruit 
users or ban them. Their decisions influence what is seen, what 
is valued, what is said. When they do their job right, they cre-
ate the conditions under which cooperation is possible. Wikipe-
dia, for all its faults, is moderated in a way that supports an 
active community of mostly productive editors. The Los Angeles 
Times, for all its good intentions, moderated the wikitorial in a 
way that provided few useful defenses against vandals. Wik-
ipedia’s moderation keeps its house in order; the Times gave 
arsonists the run of the place. 
This Article is a guided tour of moderation for legal schol-
ars. It synthesizes the accumulated insights of four groups of 
experts who have given the problem of moderation their careful 
and sustained attention. The first is moderators themselves—
those who are entrusted with the care and feeding of online 
                                                
10 Rainey, supra note 8. 
11 See generally ANDREW LIH, THE WIKIPEDIA REVOLUTION (2009). 
12 See Top Sites, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites [http://perma.cc/36H3 
-9STW] (last visited Mar. 30, 2015); see also Wikipedia: Statistics, WIK-
IPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Statistics#pageviews [http: 
//perma.cc/HW25-U4WS] (last visited Jan. 20, 2015) (reporting 4,841,082 
articles in the English-language version). 
13 But see goatse.cx, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goatse.cx [http:// 
perma.cc/7YQD-EBGH] (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) (telling rather than 
showing). 
14  See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 25-26 (1948) (“[A]t a town meeting . . . [n]o competent 
moderator would tolerate . . . wasting . . . the time available for free dis-
cussion,” but “no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it 
is on one side of the issue rather than another.”). 
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communities. They have written at length about helpful inter-
ventions and harmful ones, giving guidelines and rules of 
thumb for nudging users towards collaborative engagement.15 
A second group, the software and interface designers who are 
responsible for the technical substrate on which online com-
munities run, works closely with the first (indeed, they are of-
ten the same people). Their own professional literature offers a 
nuanced understanding of how the technical design of a social 
space influences the interactions that take place there.16 The 
third group consists of academics from a wide variety of disci-
plines—psychology, communications, and computer science, to 
name just a few—who have turned a scholarly eye on the fac-
tors that make communities thrive or wither.17 The fourth is 
                                                
15 See generally JONO BACON, THE ART OF COMMUNITY: BUILDING THE NEW 
AGE OF PARTICIPATION (2d ed. 2012); AMY JO KIM, COMMUNITY BUILDING ON 
THE WEB (2000); DEBORAH NG, ONLINE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT FOR 
DUMMIES (2011); DEREK POWAZEK, DESIGN FOR COMMUNITY (2001); JENNY 
PREECE, ONLINE COMMUNITIES: DESIGNING USABILITY, SUPPORTING SOCIA-
BILITY (2000).  
16 See generally GAVIN BELL, BUILDING SOCIAL WEB APPLICATIONS (2009); 
CHRISTIAN CRUMLISH & ERIN MALONE, DESIGNING SOCIAL INTERFACES 
(2009); F. RANDALL FARMER & BRYCE GLASS, BUILDING WEB REPUTATION 
SYSTEMS (2010); JENIFER TIDWELL, DESIGNING INTERFACES (2d ed. 2010). A 
particularly fruitful trend in this literature consists of pattern languages: 
interlocking networks of design elements that have repeatedly proven 
their worth. The idea of pattern languages comes from the work of the ar-
chitectural theorist Christopher Alexander. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER ALEX-
ANDER, THE TIMELESS WAY OF BUILDING (1979) (presenting a theory of pat-
terns); CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER ET AL., A PATTERN LANGUAGE: TOWNS, 
BUILDINGS, CONSTRUCTION (1977) (developing pattern language for archi-
tecture). Software designers took his idea of a pattern as “a careful de-
scription of a perennial solution to a recurring problem within a building 
context,” Aims & Goals, PATTERNLANGUAGE.COM, http://www.patternlangu 
age.com/aims/intro.html [http://perma.cc/9BE6-BM4A], and generalized it 
to technical problems in computer system design. See, e.g., ERICH GAMMA 
ET AL., DESIGN PATTERNS: ELEMENTS OF REUSABLE OBJECT-ORIENTED SOFT-
WARE (1994); RICHARD P. GABRIEL, PATTERNS OF SOFTWARE: TALES FROM 
THE SOFTWARE COMMUNITY (1996). From there, it was only a small step to 
develop patterns describing how people use software; indeed, these inter-
action patterns come closest to Alexander’s goal of finding patterns that 
make “towns and buildings . . . able to come alive.” ALEXANDER, A PATTERN 
LANGUAGE, supra, at x. Notable examples of pattern languages for social 
interactions using software include MEATBALLWIKI, http://meatballwiki.or 
g/wiki [http://perma.cc/9RUZ-YZNK]; YAHOO DESIGN PATTERN LIBRARY, 
https://developer.yahoo.com/ypatterns/ [https://perma.cc/RAZ6-N4XM]; 
and ONLINE MODERATION STRATEGIES, https://web.archive.org/web/200704 
19071423/http://social.itp.nyu.edu/shirky/wiki [https://perma.cc/NWZ2-W 
M5L]. This Article uses a different analytical structure to describe moder-
ation, but the themes of these pattern languages inform the thinking be-
hind it. 
17  For an outstanding synthesis of the literature, see ROBERT E. KRAUT & 
PAUL RESNICK, BUILDING SUCCESSFUL ONLINE COMMUNITIES: EVIDENCE-
BASED SOCIAL DESIGN (2012). 
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made up of journalists who cover the online beat by embedding 
themselves in communities (often in moments of high drama).18 
The Article draws on these various sources to present a 
novel taxonomy of moderation. The taxonomy takes the form of 
a grammar—a set of nouns, verbs, adverbs, and adjectives 
suitable for describing the vast array of moderation techniques 
in common use on the Internet. The Article describes these 
techniques in terms of familiar jurisprudential categories such 
as ex ante versus ex post and norms versus architecture. This 
richer understanding of moderation should be useful to schol-
ars and regulators in two ways. One is theoretical: well-
moderated online communities catalyze human cooperation. 
Studying them can provide insights into the management of 
common-pool resources and the creation of information goods, 
two problems moderation must solve simultaneously. Studying 
online communities is thus like studying fisheries or fan fic-
tion—a way to understand society. The other payoff is practi-
cal. Many laws either regulate the activities of online commu-
nities or exempt them from regulation. The wisdom of these 
choices depends on empirical facts about the value and power 
of moderation. Regulators cannot properly evaluate these laws 
without paying close attention to how moderation plays out on 
the ground. 
Part I of the Article provides basic definitions and describes 
the dual commons problems that online communities confront. 
Part II supplies the detailed grammar of moderation, liberally 
annotated with examples. Part III presents four case studies of 
moderation in action: Wikipedia, the Los Angeles Times wikito-
rial, MetaFilter, and Reddit. Part IV offers some lessons for 
regulators by examining the two most important statutes that 
regulate moderation: § 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act, and § 512 of the Copyright Act. Part V concludes. 
I. The Problem of Moderation 
By “moderation,” I mean the governance mechanisms that 
structure participation in a community to facilitate cooperation 
and prevent abuse. Part II will explain how moderation works; 
this Part lays the foundation by describing the problems it 
must solve. Section A supplies some basic definitions and de-
tails the motivations of community members; Section B de-
scribes the goals of good moderation; Section C explains why 
moderation must confront not one, but two commons problems; 
                                                
18  Examples will appear throughout the Article, but a good starting point 
would be Adrian Chen’s work. See, e.g., Adrian Chen, The Laborers Who 
Keep Dick Pics and Beheadings out of Your Facebook Feed, WIRED, Oct. 23, 
2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation [http://perma.cc/ 
FJK6-B9SC]. 
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and Section D provides a typology of the abuses against which 
moderation guards. 
A. Definitions 
Our object of study is an online community.19 A community 
can be as small as the handful of people on a private mailing 
list or as large as the Internet itself. Communities can overlap, 
as anyone on both Twitter and Facebook knows. Communities 
can also nest: the comments section at Instapundit is a mean-
ingful community, and so is the conservative blogosphere. 
There is little point in being overly precise about any given 
community’s boundaries, so long as we can identify three 
things: the community’s members, the content they share with 
each other, and the infrastructure they use to share it.20 The 
Internet as a whole is both an agglomeration of numerous 
communities and a sprawling, loosely knit community in its 
own right. Its moderation includes both the moderation within 
its constituent communities and moderation that cannot easily 
be attributed to any of them. Thus, even though it is not par-
ticularly helpful to talk about Google as a community in its 
own right,21 it and other search engines play an important role 
in the overall moderation of the Web.22 
Members can wear different hats: there are owners of the 
infrastructure, moderators of the community, and authors and 
readers of content. For example, on YouTube, Google owns the 
infrastructure; video uploaders are authors; video viewers are 
readers; and the moderators include everyone who clicks to flag 
an inappropriate video,23 the algorithms that collate user re-
                                                
19  The defined terms that make up the vocabulary of moderation will be 
written in bolded italics when they make their first appearances in the 
Article. 
20  These are virtual communities, defined by a shared virtual place rather 
than by shared geography, meaning, or practice. See generally HOWARD 
RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY (1993); Quinn Warnick, What We 
Talk About When We Talk About Talking: Ethos at Work in an Online 
Community (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State Universi-
ty), http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2480&context=etd 
[http://perma.cc/P9JK-HY2P]; see also PREECE, supra note 15, at 10-17. 
21  The problem is that there is not a close nexus between Google’s users, the 
content it indexes, and the infrastructure in Google’s server farms. Most 
of the websites whose content appears on Google are Google “users” only 
in a very loose sense, and they bring their own server infrastructure to the 
table. There is interesting moderation here, but “Google” is the wrong lev-
el of generality for identifying the community that the moderation affects. 
22  See generally James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
868, 893-96 (2014) (discussing the role of search engines in organizing the 
Internet). 
23  See Alistair Barr & Lisa Fleisher, YouTube Enlists ‘Trusted Flaggers’ to 
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ports, and the unlucky YouTube employees who manually re-
view flagged videos.24 Owners occupy a privileged position be-
cause their control over infrastructure gives them unappeala-
ble control over the community’s software-based rules.25 This 
control lets owners decide who can moderate and how. Modera-
tors, in turn, shape the flow of content from authors to readers. 
Of course, members can wear multiple hats. “NO SPOILERS!” 
is both content and a gently chiding act of moderation. 
Members have varied motivations.26 Authors want their 
messages to be seen;27 readers with diverse tastes seek content 
of interest to them.28 Moderators, like authors, want to promote 
the spread of content they care about.29 All of them can derive 
personal fulfillment and a sense of belonging from participa-
tion. On the other side of the ledger, these activities take time 
and effort. And where money changes hands, members would 
naturally prefer to be paid rather than to pay. YouTube is pop-
ular with video makers in part because it pays them a share of 
advertising revenue rather than charging them to host their 
videos.30 
Because the same person could be an author, reader, mod-
erator, and owner, these motivations interrelate. Thus, for ex-
ample, users connect their computers to peer-to-peer networks 
to download files they want, but in the process they make files 
on their computers available to other users. 31 They are willing 
to act as owners supplying infrastructure because of the value 
they receive as readers receiving content. Similarly, partici-
pants on a discussion forum may shoulder some of the work of 
                                                
24  See Brad Stone, Policing the Web’s Lurid Precincts, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/technology/19screen.html [http: 
//perma.cc/Y493-7VKF].  
25  See James Grimmelmann, Anarchy, Status Updates, and Utopia, 35 PACE 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstrac 
t_id=2358627 [http://perma.cc/4R29-AJC3] [hereinafter Grimmelmann, 
Anarchy]. 
26  See generally FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 111-20 (describing vari-
ous user motivations).  
27  See, e.g., Using a Zip Code Puts You Under Military Rule According to 
Supreme Court, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=6TEOyp1ERVc [https://perma.cc/JC3J-A8AZ]. 
28  See, e.g., [Search Results for] ASMR, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/ 
results?search_query=ASMR (last visited Mar. 19 2015) [https://perma.cc 
/9X65-RX5Y]. 
29  See, e.g., What Does It Mean to "Like" Something?, FACEBOOK, https://www 
.facebook.com/help/110920455663362 [https://perma.cc/FRY7-H27R] (“Cl-
icking Like below a post on Facebook is an easy way to let people know 
that you enjoy it.”) . 
30  See, e.g., What is the YouTube Partner Program?, YOUTUBE, https://suppo 
rt.google.com/youtube/answer/72851 [https://perma.cc/3KCZ-QWHW]. 
31  See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the 
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 
505 (2003). 
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moderation by flagging unwanted posts for deletion because 
they enjoy being part of a thriving community. Divergent moti-
vations become important only when there is a clear separation 
of roles (e.g., paid professional moderators) or when a commu-
nity is torn between participants with incompatible goals (e.g., 
amateur and professional photographers). 
B. Goals 
From these individual motivations, we can derive goals for 
moderation overall. Broadly speaking, moderation has three 
goals. First, a well-moderated community will be productive: it 
will generate and distribute valuable information goods. Some 
of these information goods are valuable in themselves (Welcome 
to Night Vale fan fiction), others because they facilitate trans-
actions (Freecycle listings), and others because they are part of 
socially important systems (political discussions). Productivity 
is the greatest common divisor of moderation goals, the one 
that everyone can agree on. Members share in the gains from 
productivity as authors and readers. Society gains, too, when 
valuable information spreads beyond the community—a classic 
example of a positive spillover.32 
Second, moderation can increase access to online communi-
ties. Openness is partly about efficiency: more members can 
make the community more productive. But openness also has 
moral consequences: cutting people off from a community cuts 
them off from the knowledge the community produces.33 Open-
ness exists along a spectrum. A wiki usable by anyone on the 
Internet is more open than a wiki open to anyone on a school’s 
network, which is in turn more open than a password-protected 
wiki open only to the graduate students of the geology depart-
ment. An important aspect of openness is democracy—
participation in moderation and in setting moderation policy. 
Again, part of the justification is instrumental: broad participa-
tion can help make moderation more effective.34 But it can also 
be important in itself for members to have a voice in making 
moderation decisions. Democratic moderation is online self-
governance.35 
                                                
32 See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007). 
33  See generally JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN 
ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP (2005). 
34  See, e.g., KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 151-52. 
35  See, e.g., David R. Johnson, David G. Post & Marc Rotenberg, Governing 
Online Spaces: Virtual Representation, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/03/facebook-governance-and-virtual-repre 
sentation [http://perma.cc/9DTM-FJTP] (“[A]ll users have a right to par-
ticipate in the processes through which the rules by which they will be 
bound are made.”). 
9
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Third, a well-moderated community will have low costs: it 
will do its work while making as few demands as possible on 
the infrastructure and on participants. Costs here include the 
obvious computational ones—servers, hard drives, network 
connections, electricity, etc.—but also include the work re-
quired of participants, such as flagging a post for removal, re-
moving a flagged post, or appealing an incorrectly removed 
post. Each individual decision may be small, but they add up 
quickly. Yahoo saved one million dollars per year in customer 
support costs by substantially automating its moderation sys-
tem for Yahoo Answers.36 
These virtues are incomparable. Different moderation tech-
niques inevitably trade off among them. Excluding the heaviest 
users, for example, hurts productivity and openness while also 
reducing costs. Even productivity and cost, both efficiency con-
cerns, have distributional components: two members may agree 
that a burden is worth bearing but disagree on who should bear 
it.  
C. Commons Problems 
One tension in particular animates the entire problem of 
moderation. Online communities have a commons problem.37 In 
fact, they have two. On the one hand, they depend on shared 
infrastructure with limited capacity. Hard drives don’t grow on 
trees. Members must collectively limit their use of infrastruc-
ture to keep this common-pool resource from collapsing.38 On 
the other hand, online communities trade in information that 
can potentially be shared without limit, so members must col-
lectively catalyze themselves into creating and sharing.39 Solv-
                                                
36  See FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 243-77. 
37  This account draws heavily on James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a 
Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2799 (2010) [hereinafter Grimmel-
mann, Semicommons], which provides a more extensive exposition and 
literature review.  
38  Id. at 2806-10 (reviewing literature). A conventional understanding of 
commonly held resources, as captured in Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of 
the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968), was that without external “mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon,” id. at 1247, exhaustion through overuse 
was inevitable. Commons theorists, led by Elinor Ostrom, showed that 
under the right conditions a community of users could itself collectively 
moderate its use of a commonly held resource. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOV-
ERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (1990). 
39  Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 37, at 2810-15 (reviewing liter-
ature). Again, a conventional account emphasized the need for external 
restraints, such as intellectual property laws. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTU-
AL PROPERTY LAW 19-21 (2003) (providing a conventional account of intel-
lectual property). Here, the counter-movement showed that some creative 
communities could self-regulate effectively and also that the absence of 
restraints could itself catalyze creativity. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRIS 
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ing both problems at once is particularly tricky because the 
most natural way to protect infrastructure is to discourage in-
tensive use by limiting access, while the most natural way to 
promote the sharing of information is to encourage extensive 
use by opening up access.40 Moderation is how online communi-
ties walk the tightrope between overuse and underuse.41 
In previous work, I described the Internet as a semicom-
mons—a resource that is owned and managed as private prop-
erty at one level but as a commons at another, and in which 
“both common and private uses are important and impact sig-
nificantly on each other.”42 The semicommons concept captures 
both the costs that authors and readers can impose on owners 
through overuse and the ways that owners can inhibit content-
sharing uses by leveraging control of the infrastructure.43 It 
also directs attention to moderation techniques that allow pro-
ductive coexistence.44 The emphasis there is on the Internet as 
a whole, but the same problems—and similar solutions—recur 
in smaller online communities.45  
Brett Frischmann’s theory of infrastructure also cleanly de-
scribes online communities. Indeed, I have borrowed the term 
because the fit is so precise.46 To Frischmann, an infrastruc-
tural resource satisfies three criteria: 
(1) The resource may be consumed nonrivalrous-
ly for some appreciable range of demand. 
                                                                                                         
SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 
(2012); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the 
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). 
40  See Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open 
Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1505-06 (2013); 
Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 37, at 2815. 
41  See Mayo Fuster Morell, Governance of Online Creation Communities for 
the Building of Digital Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 
281 (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strand-
burg eds., 2014) (linking information production, infrastructure use, and 
community governance). 
42  Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 37, at 2816 (quoting Henry E. 
Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 132 (2000)). But see Benkler, supra note 40, at 1522-23 
(criticizing the application of semicommons theory). 
43  Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 37, at 2817. 
44  Id. at 2816-18. 
45  Id. at 2823-41 (giving case studies). 
46  BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED 
RESOURCES (2012). Another early and sophisticated treatment of the nexus 
between tangible and intangible resources is Carol M. Rose, The Comedy 
of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986). For a recent literature review, see 
Benkler, supra note 40. 
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(2) Social demand for the resource is driven pri-
marily by downstream productive activity 
that requires the resource as an input. 
(3) The resource may be used as an input into a 
wide range of goods and services . . . .47 
This account captures the congestible but renewable nature of 
online infrastructure, the interdependence between infrastruc-
ture and content, and the diversity of content. Frischmann ar-
gues for managing infrastructure as a commons with nondis-
criminatory access rules, subject to nondiscriminatory use re-
strictions for “securing the commons itself,”48 an embrace of 
openness that recognizes the interplay of productivity and cost. 
D. Abuses 
The interface between infrastructure and information is 
vulnerable to some predictable forms of strategic behavior, in-
cluding spam, harassment, and other famous pathologies of 
online life. These are the abuses against which moderation 
must guard. Moderation need not prevent them entirely—and 
probably cannot without killing the commons—but it must 
keep them within acceptable bounds, and without driving up 
the costs of moderation itself to unacceptable levels.49 The 
abuses fall into four broad categories: congestion, cacophony, 
abuse, and manipulation. 
The first pair of problems involves overuse. Each partici-
pant’s contribution of content makes demands both on the in-
frastructure and on other participants. At the infrastructure 
level, overuse causes congestion, which makes it harder for any 
information to get through and can cause the infrastructure to 
stagger and fall.50 At the content level, overuse causes cacoph-
ony, which makes it harder for participants to find what they 
want. In trademark terms, they must incur search costs to sort 
through the information available to them.51 Both congestion 
and cacophony are problems of prioritization: bad content 
crowds out good, to the private benefit of the content’s promot-
ers but at an overall cost to the community. The difference is 
that in congestion, the resource constraint is the infrastruc-
ture’s capacity, whereas in cacophony, the constraint is partici-
                                                
47  FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at xiv. 
48  Id. at 92; see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two 
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454-
55 (2002) (differentiating access and use restrictions as strategies for 
managing resource use). 
49  See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the 
Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 132, 141-42 (2000). 
50  See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 136-58. 
51  See James Grimmelmann, Information Policy for the Library of Babel, 3 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 29 (2008). 
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pants’ attention.52 Spam is the classic example of overuse caus-
ing both congestion and cacophony.53 A denial-of-service attack 
is an attempt to create congestion for its own sake. 
Next, there is abuse, in which the community generates 
negative-value content—information “bads” rather than infor-
mation goods.54 Abuse is distinctively a problem of information 
exchange.  The harms it causes are the harms information 
causes as speech that is understood and acted on by humans. 
Harassment is the classic example of abuse directed at particu-
lar people, while trolling is the classic example of abuse di-
rected at the community in general.55 In its extreme form, 
abuse involves an entire community uniting to share content in 
a way that harms the rest of society, such as trading copyright-
ed movies pre-release, planning the assassination of doctors 
who perform abortions, or starting offensive hoaxes.56 
Finally, there is manipulation, in which ideologically moti-
vated participants try to skew the information available 
through the community.57 A forum moderator on a science dis-
cussion site who deletes posts from climate scientists while 
leaving posts from climate change deniers is engaging in ma-
nipulation, as is  a retailer that games its way to the top of 
search rankings with link farms and hidden text. The classic 
pathological case of manipulation is the edit war, in which wiki 
                                                
52  For an early explanation of this distinction in terms of “exploitation” and 
“pollution,” see Gian Maria Greco & Luciano Floridi, The Tragedy of the 
Digital Commons, 6 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 73, 76 (2004). 
53  This general definition of overuse emphasizes that spam is a problem 
hardly confined to email. See Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 
37, at 2839 (“[A]ny sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable 
from a spam vector.”); see generally FINN BRUNTON, SPAM: A SHADOW HIS-
TORY OF THE INTERNET (2013) (cataloging other forms of spam). 
54  See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and 
Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 1435 (2011). 
55  See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 
1493-97 (2007). A troll “posts deliberately erroneous or antagonistic mes-
sages to a newsgroup or similar forum with the intention of eliciting a 
hostile or corrective response,” Troll, n.1, OXFORD ENG. DICT. (Draft addi-
tions Mar. 2006), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/206613 [http://perma.cc 
/4AHN-P3ZL], often with “willful, disingenuous provocation and malicious 
deceit.” David Auerbach, Anonymity as Culture: Treatise, TRIPLE CANOPY, 
http://canopycanopycanopy.com/contents/anonymity_as_culture__treatise 
[http://perma.cc/3UNF-SJE4]. 
56  See, e.g., Caitlin Dewey, 4Chan’s Latest, Terrible Prank: Convincing West 
Africans that Ebola Doctors Actually Worship the Disease, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/20 
14/09/22/4chans-latest-terrible-prank-convincing-west-africans-that-ebola-
doctors-actually-worship-the-disease [http://perma.cc/2WUX-DBFJ]. 
57  See Christopher E. Peterson, User-Generated Censorship: Manipulating 
the Maps of Social Media (2013) (unpublished M.S. dissertation, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology), http://cmsw.mit.edu/user-generated-
censorship [http://perma.cc/8TJN-2CVB]. 
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users with conflicting ideologies engage in a wasteful conflict to 
make a page reflect their point of view. Like abuse, manipula-
tion is distinctively a problem of information exchange: it is 
possible whenever some information can be deleted entirely, or 
when participants can exploit each other’s cognitive limits. The 
difference is that, in abuse, the content itself is the problem, 
while in manipulation, worthwhile content is handled in a way 
that harms the community. The dueling pro- and anti-war edits 
to the Los Angeles Times wikitorial were manipulation; the 
pornography that followed was abuse. 
II. The Grammar of Moderation 
Now that we have seen the problems that moderation faces, 
we can discuss how it solves them. We have already met the 
basic definitions: a community of members who use shared in-
frastructure to exchange content. The members have roles: as 
owners of infrastructure, as authors and readers of content, and 
as moderators. These are the nouns in the grammar of modera-
tion. 
Section A of this Part describes the verbs—the four princi-
pal techniques of moderation. Two are relatively simple. Exclu-
sion keeps unwanted members out of the community entirely; 
pricing uses market forces to allocate participation. The other 
two are more complex. In organization, moderators reshape 
the flow of content from authors to readers; in norm-setting, 
they inculcate community-serving values in other members. 
Together, these are the basic tools of moderation. 
Section B considers some important distinctions in how 
moderation is carried out. Each of these distinctions can be ap-
plied to any of the moderation techniques to give it different 
inflections. If the techniques are verbs, these distinctions are 
the adverbs. First, moderation can be carried out manually, by 
human moderators making individualized decisions in specific 
cases, or automatically, by algorithms making uniform deci-
sions in every case matching a specified pattern. Second, mod-
eration can be done transparently, with each decision and its 
reasoning available for public review, or opaquely, behind the 
electronic equivalent of closed doors. Third, there is the famil-
iar distinction between regulation ex ante and regulation ex 
post—deterrence versus punishment, protection versus repair. 
And fourth, moderation can be centralized and carried out by 
one powerful moderator making global decisions, or decentral-
ized and carried out by many dispersed moderators making lo-
cal decisions. 
Section C then examines some underlying community char-
acteristics that can significantly influence the success or failure 
of the different moderation techniques. These are adjectives: 
they modify the nouns (especially “community”) in the gram-
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mar of moderation. Sometimes they are set by the community 
at large, while at other times they are under the control of 
moderators or regulators. First, there is the capacity of the in-
frastructure. Greater capacity comes at a higher cost but is less 
prone to congestion. Second, there is the size of the community. 
Larger communities can engage in broader sharing but are less 
cohesive. Third, ownership of the infrastructure may be more 
or less concentrated, which affects the distribution of power 
among members and hence their influence over moderation de-
cisions. Fourth, members may be more or less identified within 
the community: rich identities enhance trust and cooperation 
but can also be a barrier to participation. 
This is a rich, complicated taxonomy. Its subtleties are not 
to be grasped on this first, abbreviated glance. This is just the 
map, the outline whose broad contours we will now fill in. 
A. Techniques (Verbs) 
The real study of moderation begins with the verbs of mod-
eration—the basic actions that moderators can take to affect 
the dynamics of a community. There are four: excluding, pric-
ing, organizing, and norm-setting.58 
1. Excluding 
Exclusion is fundamental in property theory because of its 
simplicity.59 Rather than attempt to calibrate specific uses, one 
simply excludes outsiders from all uses.60 In an online commu-
nity, exclusion deprives the community of the contributions 
that those who are excluded could have made. But that loss can 
be justified when exclusion inhibits strategic behavior. It can 
be used against any form of strategic behavior by targeting 
those users who engage in that behavior—for example, to re-
duce congestion by excluding known spammers. 
The processes used to decide who will be excluded can fall 
anywhere along the spectrum from highly precise to absurdly 
crude. Mark Lemley individually vets each subscriber to the 
CyberProfs mailing list; for a time, Facebook was available only 
                                                
58  The account given here draws on several strands of legal theory. Foremost 
among them is Lessig’s theory of four modalities of regulation: law, norms, 
markets, and architecture. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: 
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507-11 (1999); James 
Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719 (2005). 
Other strands include property theory and commons theory. 
59  Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730 (1998). 
60  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 48. Exclusion is therefore an architectural 
constraint in Lessig’s four-modalities taxonomy. Lessig, supra note 58. It 
acts automatically and immediately to prevent non-members from partic-
ipating. Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, supra note 58, at 1723. 
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to users with a .edu email address.61 At any level of precision, a 
particularly important decision is whether the default is inclu-
sion or exclusion. A default of inclusion gives everyone, well-
intentioned or not, at least one bite at the apple.62 Exclusion 
can also be applied independently to different roles. It is com-
mon, for example, to let anyone read a discussion board but to 
allow only registered users to post.63 
2. Pricing 
Pricing inhibits participation, both good and bad, by raising 
its costs.64 Pricing is more information intensive than exclusion 
because one must set the level of prices.65 Some prices are ex-
plicit, such as World of Warcraft’s $14.99 per month subscrip-
tion fee. Other prices are implicit: Twitter’s abuse-reporting 
process is long and involved, so anyone who wants to report 
abuse must pay with their time.66 Advertising is a prevalent 
form of implicit pricing: readers pay with their time and atten-
tion.  
Any of the different roles can be priced separately. Author-
ship is the obvious target to be priced first because of its band-
width demands.67 Pricing can be applied at many levels of 
granularity, from flat-rate all-access passes to microtransac-
tions for each action. At one extreme, prohibitively high prices 
collapse into de facto exclusion. At the other extreme, free is a 
price, too—one that sends a broadly welcoming signal to poten-
tial members.68 Prices can even be negative, in which case they 
                                                
61  See Janet Kornblum, Facebook Will Soon Be Available to Everyone, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 11, 2006, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-09-
11-facebook-everyone_x.htm [http://perma.cc/5CVL-WYKA]. 
62  For an example of why an inward-looking community might nonetheless 
choose inclusion by default, see Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and 
“Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.U. L. REV. 1315 (2009). 
63  See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, METAFILTER, http://faq.metafilter.co 
m/#38 [http://perma.cc/7ZJ4-S9GE]. 
64  See Lessig, supra note 58, at 507-08. 
65  See Smith, supra note 48, at S471-72. 
66  See Mary Anne Franks, The Many Ways Twitter Is Bad at Responding to 
Abuse, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 14, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/technolog 
y/archive/2014/08/the-many-ways-twitter-is-bad-at-responding-to-abuse/3 
76100 [http://perma.cc/X8EN-ADQM]. On implicit prices, see generally 
PREECE, supra note 15, at 133-43 (discussing usability factors in online 
communities). 
67  Flickr, for example, offers unlimited access for viewing photos, requires a 
free account to post up to 1TB of photos, and sells a second TB of storage 
for $499 a year. The three bands consist of no price, an implicit price, and 
an explicit price. Overall, authorship is priced higher than readership. See 
Free Accounts, Upgrading and Gifts, FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com/help/ 
limits [https://perma.cc/N9NN-BBW6]. 
68  See generally CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE 
(2009). 
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provide a subsidy. For example, when it launched, Epinions 
paid users to write reviews.69 
As taxes on participation, prices have two basic purposes. 
One is to raise revenue for the community’s use, typically by 
charging authors and readers to compensate owners (for sup-
plying infrastructure) and professional moderators (for their 
work). The other is Pigouvian—to make members internalize 
some of the costs of their behavior.70 Pricing is naturally well-
suited to account for congestion.71 A per-message email fee, for 
example, would reduce spam by forcing senders to account for 
some of the resources spam sucks up.72 This type of pricing can 
also induce participants to signal their quality, ideally deter-
ring those who have little to offer the community.73 A $5, one-
time registration fee, small as it is, can provide a substantial 
deterrent to casual malcontents.74  
3. Organizing 
Organization shapes the flow of content from authors to 
readers.75 It is the verb of moderation that most takes ad-
vantage of the informational capabilities of computers.76 Cate-
gorizing messages on a bulletin board by topic is organization. 
So is searching them by keyword, counting the number of mes-
sages, or deleting off-topic messages. These are all ways of re-
mixing authors’ contributions to give readers a more satisfying 
experience. 
It is helpful to think of organizing techniques as being built 
up from several basic operations: 
                                                
69  See Eric Goldman, Epinions, The Path-Breaking Website, Is Dead. Some 
Lessons It Taught Us, FORBES, Mar. 12, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
ericgoldman/2014/03/12/epinions-the-path-breaking-website-is-dead-some-
lessons-it-taught-us [http://perma.cc/M57J-RUVA]. Paying authors and 
moderators can backfire to the extent that payments crowd out other mo-
tivations. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 96-97 (2006). 
70  See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 157-58. 
71  See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 146-49. 
72  See, e.g., Cynthia Dwork & Moni Naor, Pricing via Processing or Combat-
ting Junk Mail, in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY—CRYPTO ’92 139 (1993) 
(implementing pricing by requiring “sender to compute some moderately 
expensive, but not intractable, function”). 
73  See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 148. 
74  KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 200; rusty [Rusty Foster], K5 Becomes 
“Gated Dysfunctional Community”, KURO5HIN (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www 
.kuro5hin.org/story/2007/9/10/13920/3664 [http://perma.cc/X27E-BUUT]. 
75  In Lessig’s taxonomy, organization is another application of architecture. 
Lessig, supra note 58, at 508-09. 
76  For a thoughtful catalog of organizational interface patterns, see generally 
TIDWELL, supra note 16, especially chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7. 
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• Deletion is the removal of content. A bulletin board 
administrator who excises off-topic and profanity-laden 
posts is engaged in deletion.77 
• Editing is the alteration of content. It ranges from 
correcting typos to changing the very essence of a post. 
At the limit, editing is deletion plus authorship: the 
moderator rejects an author’s reality and substitutes 
her own. 
• Annotation is the addition of information about con-
tent.78 eBay’s feedback system annotates buyers and 
sellers; Facebook’s Likes annotate posts and comments; 
Amazon’s user-written reviews and lists are annotations 
that have crossed the line and become content in their 
own right. 
• Synthesis is the transformative combination of piec-
es of content. Wikipedia is the ultimate example of syn-
thesis. There, small and heterogeneous changes by indi-
vidual users are synthesized into entire encyclopedia 
entries. On a smaller scale, an online poll synthesizes 
individual votes into totals. 
• Filtering is deletion’s non-destructive cousin: the 
content is still there, but readers see a specialized sub-
set of it. A search engine filters; so does a blog’s list of 
the ten most recent comments. At the limit, filtering as-
ymptotically approaches deletion: the ten-thousandth 
search result might as well not exist. 
• Formatting is the styling of of content for presenta-
tion to readers. Good typography improves readability; 
sensible ordering and grouping of images makes it pos-
sible to scan through them quickly. 
Like the other verbs, organization is itself costly but can re-
duce strategic behavior. Organization directly attacks cacopho-
ny by helping readers see only the content they want. At the 
                                                
77  Ephemerality is a species of deletion. Snapchat photos vanish within se-
conds to provide privacy and engagement. See danah boyd, Why Snapchat 
Is Valuable: It’s All About Attention, APOPHENIA, Mar. 21, 2014, 
http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2014/03/21/snapchat-attention 
.html [http://perma.cc/YA2Y-FLKF] (“The underlying message is simple: 
You’ve got 7 seconds. PAY ATTENTION. And when people do choose to 
open a Snap, they actually stop what they’re doing and look.”). But see 
Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. 132 3078 (Dec. 31, 2014) (alleging a failure by 
Snapchat to secure privacy of photos). Ephemerality can be destructive of 
community. As Sarah Jeong says of Twitter, “Mix ephemerality, discon-
nectedness, and stable identities, and you get ever-lasting grudges filtered 
through a game of Telephone.” @sarahjeong, TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2014), 
https://twitter.com/sarahjeong/status/519990219043389440 [https://perma 
.cc/8F8N-U9FE]. 
78  See FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 39-65, 131-61 (providing a rich 
taxonomy of annotation systems). 
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same time, organization indirectly reduces cacophony by reduc-
ing the incentives for authors to create low-value content that 
readers don’t want and will never see.79 Only deletion directly 
attacks congestion, but all forms of organization have the same 
indirect effect of reducing the incentive to spam.80 On the other 
hand, organization can be a tool for manipulation in the hands 
of self-interested moderators. Think, for example, of a Judean 
People’s Front sympathizer deleting every mention of the Peo-
ple’s Front of Judea on a Roman forum.81 Finally, depending on 
how it is used, organization can either greatly amplify or great-
ly inhibit abuse: compare a gossip site that deletes crude sexual 
comments with one that invites them. 
The real complexity of organization comes when one uses 
multiple types of organization at once. An email list moderator 
who deletes some posts and marks others as “important” is 
simultaneously filtering and annotating. A user who flags an 
Amazon review as helpful is annotating it. Amazon then syn-
thesizes the flags into totals and filters users’ views based on 
those totals.82 Wikipedia’s Talk pages are annotation applied to 
the synthesis process.83 Slashdot’s moderation provides an an-
notative input into filtration (readers can choose to see only 
highly rated comments), in the process making the annotations 
themselves the subject of “meta-moderation.”84 
Finally, of course, organization interacts with the other 
verbs. Reddit gives its paid Gold users better filtering tools 
than regular users.85 In many communities, those who are 
flagged by other participants for poor contributions may be 
                                                
79  Filtration hides unwanted content; deletion removes it outright; annota-
tion enables readers to evaluate the content’s relevance to them without 
actually reading it; and synthesis turns several moderate-value contribu-
tions into one higher-value one. 
80  On the other hand, readers facing lower search costs will increase their 
consumption, both encouraging them to greater creation of their own and 
also raising the incentives for authors to contribute. Thus, since organiza-
tion can increase contribution through one mechanism and deter it 
through another, the overall impact of effective organization on infra-
structure owners’ private costs is indeterminate. 
81  See Monty Python’s Life of Brian (HandMade Films 1979). 
82  For a detailed visual grammar for describing these multi-stage systems of 
organization, see FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16. 
83  See DARIUSZ JEMIELNIAK, COMMON KNOWLEDGE? AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WIK-
IPEDIA (2014). 
84  See Clifford A. Lampe, Ratings Use in an Online Discussion System: The 
Slashdot Case (2006) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan), http:// 
deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39369/lampe_diss_revis
ed.pdf [http://perma.cc/BN9G-REAK].  
85  See Reddit Gold, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/gold/about [http://perma.c 
c/2X5J-QZU9]. 
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banned—resulting in exclusion based on annotation based on 
social norms.86 
4. Norm-Setting 
Moderation’s biggest challenge and most important mission 
is to create strong shared norms among participants. Norms 
can target every form of strategic behavior. For example, if eve-
ry author refrains from personal attacks, there is no further 
personal-attack problem to be solved. Beneficial norms, howev-
er, cannot simply be set by fiat. By definition, they are an 
emergent property of social interactions. Moderators have lim-
ited power over group norms. Most of the levers they can pull 
will only nudge norms in one direction or another, possibly un-
predictably. Good norm-setting is a classic example of know-
how. There are heuristics, but knowing whether to chastise an 
uncivil user publicly or privately is not a decision that can be 
made in the abstract.87 Blogger Jason Kottke summed up the 
challenges of norm-setting with characteristic verve: 
Punishing the offenders and erasing the graffiti 
is the easy part . . . [F]ostering “a culture that 
encourages both personal expression and con-
structive conversation” is much more difficult. 
Really fucking hard, in fact . . . it requires near-
constant vigilance. If I opened up comments on 
everything on kottke.org, I could easily employ 
someone for 8-10 hours per week to keep things 
clean, facilitate constructive conversation, coax-
ing troublemakers into becoming productive 
members of the community, etc. Both MetaFilter 
and Flickr have dedicated staff to perform such 
duties . . . I imagine other community sites do as 
well. If you've been ignoring all of the uncivility 
on your site for the past 2 years, it's going to be 
difficult to clean it up. The social patterns of your 
community’s participants, once set down, are dif-
ficult to modify in a significant way.88 
                                                
86  See Kate Crawford & Tarleton Gillespie, What Is a Flag for? Social Media 
Reporting Tools and the Vocabulary of Complaint, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 
(2014). 
87  See, e.g., NG, supra note 15, at 77-83, 94-97; Warnick, supra note 20, at 
113 (“[A] strong collective ethos—generated by individuals but bigger than 
any one person—is essential to maintaining a successful online communi-
ty.”). 
88  Jason Kottke, The Blogger Code, KOTTKE.ORG (Apr. 9, 2007), http://kottke 
.org/07/04/the-blogger-code [http://perma.cc/H9US-3V6N ]. 
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Some communities depend on shared norms. Discussion 
groups, for example, are acutely sensitive to group norms. It 
only takes a few determined spammers or trolls to bring a dis-
cussion to a screeching halt.89 But other communities can pros-
per even when some norms are widely flouted. Spammers and 
trolls still abound on the Internet, but they have not yet man-
aged to ruin it for everyone. Google may not be able to make 
spammers clean up their act, but it can hide their antics.90 The 
difference illustrates the two roles that the other verbs of mod-
eration can play. Sometimes, they keep order directly, in the 
face of bad behavior; at other times, they keep order indirectly, 
by encouraging good behavior. That is, the other three verbs 
are both substitutes for and sources of norms, and communities 
vary in the balance they strike between these two roles. 
Moderators can influence norms directly by articulating 
them. They can do this either in general, with codes of conduct 
and other broad statements of rules, or in specific cases by 
praising good behavior and criticizing bad. The difference is the 
difference between “Don’t post images containing nudity” and 
“This post has been deleted because it contained nudity.” Note, 
however, that stating a norm does not automatically promote 
it. There is empirical evidence that, in some circumstances, ex-
pressing a norm about user behavior can induce exactly the op-
posite response.91 
Moderators can also influence norms indirectly, through the 
other verbs.92 A list of “new and noteworthy posts” doesn’t just 
help users find good posts through organization, it also edu-
cates them in what makes a post good in the first place. Put 
another way, moderators can use the other three verbs not just 
to regulate but also to nudge. The flip side of this point, though, 
is that any time a moderator uses one of the other verbs, she 
                                                
89  See Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 37, at 2834-39 (discussing 
vulnerability of Usenet discussion groups in face of breakdown of shared 
norms). 
90  See GOOGLE, Fighting Spam, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsear 
chworks/fighting-spam.html [http://perma.cc/8LDU-CTGK]. For an exam-
ple of the controversies that search engine anti-spam efforts can generate, 
see Josh Constine, Google Destroys Rap Genius’ Search Rankings As Pun-
ishment For SEO Spam, But Resolution in Progress, TECHCRUNCH, Dec. 
25, 2013, http://techcrunch.com/2013/12/25/google-rap-genius [http://perm 
a.cc/M465-5SYJ]. 
91  See, e.g., Justin Cheng et al., How Community Feedback Shapes User Be-
havior, PROC. INT’L CONF. WEBLOGS & SOCIAL MEDIA (2014), http://cs.stanfo 
rd.edu/people/jure/pubs/disqus-icwsm14.pdf [http://perma.cc/9WW3-A9CH] 
(“Instead, we find that community feedback is likely to perpetuate unde-
sired behavior. In particular, punished authors actually write worse in 
subsequent posts, while rewarded authors do not improve significantly.”). 
92  The other verbs of moderation are, in this sense, secondary to norm-
setting. Either they encourage users to comply with community norms, or 
they step in when norms have failed. 
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nudges participants’ norms, whether she intends to or not. For 
example, excluding a well-known commenter can reduce partic-
ipants’ sense of trust in a moderator, even if the exclusion is 
justified. Experienced moderators evaluate every design deci-
sion in terms of its effects on community norms. 
A few particularly important ways to promote good norms 
reflect the accumulated wisdom of community managers. By 
far the most significant is fostering a sense of shared identity 
that reinforces participants’ sense of belonging and their com-
mitment to the good of the community.93 Another is the initia-
tion of new participants, who must be taught the community’s 
expectations at the same time as they are made to feel wel-
come.94 Highlighting good behavior and hiding bad behavior 
reinforce participants’ sense that good behavior is prevalent 
while also teaching them what to do.95 As a result, designers 
frequently worry about how to balance competitive and cooper-
ative impulses. Competition can spur users to individual effort 
at the cost of social cohesion, and different communities strike 
the balance differently.96 
B. Distinctions (Adverbs) 
Picking a verb of moderation does not end the process. Each 
verb can be used in quite different ways. There are four im-
portant distinctions that affect how a type of moderation oper-
ates: (1) humans vs. computers, (2) secret vs. transparent, (3) 
ex ante vs. ex post, and (4) centralized vs. decentralized. These 
are the “adverbs” of moderation. These four distinctions are in-
dependent: any Verb of moderation can be applied using any of 
the sixteen possible combinations. For example, spam filters 
are a secret, decentralized, automatic, ex post form of organiza-
tion (specifically, deletion). A chat room facilitator is a central-
ized, human, transparent norm-setter who acts both ex ante 
and ex post and may have access to tools for exclusion and dele-
tion.  
1. Automatically / Manually 
Moderation decisions can be made automatically by soft-
ware or manually by people.97 To take a simple example, a poli-
                                                
93  See, e.g., KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 79-115. 
94  See, e.g., NG, supra note 15, at 179-92. 
95  See, e.g., KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 140-150. 
96  See, e.g., CRUMLISH & MALONE, supra note 16, at 155-59. 
97  In a narrow sense, all moderation decisions are applied by software be-
cause an online community is entirely a creature of software. Grimmel-
mann, Anarchy, supra note 25. And in a broad sense, all policy decisions 
are ultimately made by the people who control and program the software. 
Id. We are concerned here with the intermediate question of which actor 
is responsible for day-to-day, garden-variety moderation decisions. The 
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cy against foul language could be implemented either through 
a software filter that blocks the seven dirty words or by a cen-
sor who reads everything and decides what does and does not 
cross the line.98 Humans have been setting norms, excluding, 
pricing, and organizing for millennia. Software, too, can do all 
four, albeit with varying aptitude. Software is effective at en-
forcing some exclusion decisions. Geotargeting, for example, 
limits access based on physical location.99 On the other hand, 
some exclusion criteria remain easier to apply manually. Whis-
per employs a small army of moderators in the Philippines to 
screen images for “pornography, gore, minors, sexual solicita-
tion, sexual body parts/images, [and] racism.”100 Software is 
even more effective at pricing. Offering standardized price 
terms to anyone in the world is the kind of low-granularity but 
universal application for which it is comparatively easy to write 
software.101 Improved machine learning and data-mining tech-
nologies have led to stunning advances in software-abetted or-
ganization in the last decade, particularly in search (a hybrid of 
synthesis and filtration).102 Software is least good at norm-
setting, due to its lack of understanding of human subtleties, 
but it can still participate. Design features signal attitudes, can 
elicit empathetic reactions from participants, can mimic norm-
affecting participation, and can shape what other participants 
see.103 
Three characteristics of software I identified in Regulation 
by Software play out predictably when software is used for 
moderation.104 First, software moderation has higher fixed 
costs but much lower marginal costs than human moderation. 
It takes more work to tell a computer what to do than to tell a 
                                                                                                         
choice is whether humans themselves make specific decisions about par-
ticular content or whether they delegate those decisions to algorithms. 
98  But see Declan McCullagh, Google’s Chastity Belt Too Tight, CNET NEWS, 
Apr. 23, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1032_3-5198125.html [http://per 
ma.cc/HM8L-ZWXA] (describing the “Scunthorpe problem” of overzealous 
software filters that find false positives of prohibited terms embedded in 
innocent phrases). 
99  See generally Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implica-
tions of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 567 (2012). 
100  See Chen, supra note 18. 
101  See generally Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
629 (2012); Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, supra note 58, at 
1746-49. 
102  See generally Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, supra note 22; see also R. 
Stuart Geiger, The Lives of Bots, in CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA 
READER 78-93 (Geert Lovink & Nathaniel Tkacz eds., 2011) (describing 
the use of bots on Wikipedia for mass organization). 
103  See, e.g., Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy 
and Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809 (2010); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261 (2003). 
104  Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, supra note 58. 
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human, but once the programming work is done, it is cheap to 
use it in thousands or millions of cases.105 No human could pos-
sibly carry out the millions of sorting decisions Reddit makes 
on a daily basis. Software is also more rule-bound than humans 
are. Thus, software is comparatively more effective at making 
decisions that can be reduced to “hard” facts and figures, such 
as how many messages a user has sent or how widely a given 
message has been distributed.106 And third, software fails dif-
ferently than humans: it can fail all at once and is vulnerable 
to hacking. This is not to say that software is always less relia-
ble or secure—humans make inexplicable errors and are vul-
nerable to social manipulation. But most of the time, human 
decision-making is more robust than software decision mak-
ing.107 
The tradeoff between cost and quality is characteristic of 
the choice between human and automated moderation. More 
human attention generally means better but costlier decisions. 
One of the reasons that user-generated moderation is so attrac-
tive to Internet companies is that it allows for human modera-
tion’s greater responsiveness while pushing the associated 
costs off onto users. Companies are also now increasingly using 
outsourced labor to drive down the cost of human review.108 
Paradoxically, by turning human moderation into assembly-
line piecework, these companies make it more and more like 
automated moderation—cheap, but also rule-bound and inflex-
ible. 
2. Transparently / Secretly 
Every moderation decision has some observable conse-
quences, but some are more observable than others. Transpar-
ent moderation makes explicit and public what the moderators 
have done and why, revealing what the overall moderation pol-
icies are and how they apply in each specific case. Secret mod-
eration hides the details. This distinction is really a spectrum: 
moderation could be transparent about the what but not the 
why, or transparent only some of the time. Generally speaking, 
transparency takes additional work to implement, just as hav-
ing judges give reasoned explanations of their decisions in-
creases the judicial workload. 
                                                
105  Id. at 1729. 
106  Id. at 1732-34. 
107  Id. at 1742-45. 
108  See Chen, supra note 18; see also Tarleton Gillespie, The Dirty Job of 
Keeping Facebook Clean, CULTURE DIGITALLY, Feb. 22, 2012, http://culture 
digitally.org/2012/02/the-dirty-job-of-keeping-facebook-clean  [http://perma 
.cc/A4ED-B3G8] (discussing Facebook’s detailed guidelines for outsourced 
moderators). 
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It is easier to be secretive about some kinds of moderation 
than others. Someone who is excluded from a community will 
generally be able to tell that they are being denied access, alt-
hough it is sometimes possible to disguise the fact that it is de-
liberate.109 Prices, for the most part, also need to be known to 
be effective in shaping choices, although implicit prices and mi-
cropayments can create some wiggle room.110 Organization has 
the most room for secrecy. Search users don’t know what pages 
Google hides from them; Facebook users may not realize that 
the News Feed is only a partial list of posts from friends.111 
Conversely, secret norms are close to an oxymoron: norms must 
be known to be effective. 
The choice between transparency and secrecy in exclusion, 
pricing, and organization can have indirect effects on norms. 
On the one hand, transparency enhances legitimacy, providing 
community support for moderation, while secrecy raises fears 
of censorship and oppression.112 On the other, the “Streisand 
Effect” can undermine the effectiveness of exclusion or deletion: 
censorship attempts call attention to the censored material.113 
Indeed, censorship can undermine norms by suggesting that 
the unwanted behavior is prevalent and can even draw trolls 
seeking attention.114 One clever technique for splitting the dif-
ference is disemvoweling—leaving only the consonants in an 
inappropriate comment.115  
The choice between secrecy and transparency also interacts 
with the choice between software and humans. The more com-
                                                
109  See, e.g., KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 137-38. 
110  “Micropayments are systems that make it easy to pay small amounts of 
money.” Michael Kinsley, You Can't Sell News by the Slice, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 9, 2009, at A27. See generally Clay Shirky, The Case Against Micro-
payments, O'REILLY P2P (Dec. 19, 2000), http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p 
2p/2000/12/19/micropayments.html [http://perma.cc/ZU9F-JK7F] (critizing 
micropayment systems). 
111  See J. Nathan Matias, Uncovering Algorithms: Looking Inside the Face-
book News Feed, MIT CTR. FOR CIVIC MEDIA (July 22, 2014), https://civic.m 
it.edu/blog/natematias/uncovering-algorithms-looking-inside-the-facebook-
news-feed [https://perma.cc/9GUD-87YT]. 
112  See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 138; NG, supra note 15, at 104-07. 
113  The canonical example of the Streisand effect is the trope namer: Barbra 
Streisand’s failed attempt to suppress distribution of an aerial photograph 
of her house, which led hundreds of thousands of people to seek out the 
photograph. See Paul Rogers, Streisand’s Home Becomes Hit on Web, SAN 
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 24, 2003, http://www.californiacoastline.org/ne 
ws/sjmerc5.html [http://perma.cc/4JE4-VUSR]. 
114  See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 145. 
115  See Cory Doctorow, How to Keep Hostile Jerks from Taking over Your 
Online Community, INFORMATION WEEK (May 14, 2007), http://www.infor 
mationweek.com/how-to-keep-hostile-jerks-from-taking-over-your-online-
community/d/d-id/1055100 [http://perma.cc/7ZS5-DWCS] (arguing that 
disemvoweling “takes the sting out of” abusive comments without censor-
ing them, and also signals community norms). 
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plex an algorithm, the harder to explain why it does what it 
does in a way that is intelligible to humans and the greater the 
risk that it will act unaccountably.116 Yet secrecy may be neces-
sary: transparency is riskier with software than with people 
because there is a danger of unchecked loopholes.117 Anti-spam 
email filtering, for example, depends in part for its success on 
the fact that spammers are unaware of the exact details of fil-
tering and so cannot send messages guaranteed to sneak past 
filters. The costs of secrecy do not just fall on abusive users, 
though. Google’s secretive ways, adopted as a defense against 
search engine optimizers, make it hard for innocent websites to 
understand why their search rankings have fallen. 
3. Ex Ante / Ex Post 
Moderators can act ex ante—using their power over the in-
frastructure to allow some actions and prohibit others—or they 
can act ex post—using their powers to punish evildoers and set 
right that which has gone wrong. Acting ex ante takes ad-
vantage of software’s architectural features; acting ex post is a 
more traditionally law-like technique.118 Ex ante moderation 
can produce consistency by applying the same rules to all con-
tent. Ex post moderation can conserve resources by directing 
moderators’ attention only where it is needed. 
The distinction plays out differently for different verbs. Ex 
ante exclusion can work in three ways. First, it can ration ac-
cess to limit congestion and cacophony. A chat room with ten 
participants is easier to follow than one with a hundred all go-
ing full-speed.119 Second, it can be a crude filter that uses a 
member’s identity as a proxy for the value of her contributions: 
a company might reasonably assume that non-employees have 
little to add to the discussion on its legal department’s email 
list.120 Finally, it can limit community size: smaller communi-
ties may eo ipso be better able to cooperate because they have 
stronger norms.121 Ex post exclusion is a punishment for mis-
                                                
116  See Matias, supra note 111 (“Is there any person at Facebook who knows 
how the algorithm works?”); see generally Danielle Keats Citron, Techno-
logical Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2007). 
117  See FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 91-93. 
118  See Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, supra note 58, at 1729-30. 
The distinction has been regularly rediscovered. See, e.g., Michael L. Rich, 
Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795 
(2013); Danny Rosenthal, Assessing Digital Preemption (and the Future of 
Law Enforcement?), 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 576 (2011). 
119  See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 144-46. 
120  PREECE, supra note 15, at 273 (discussing special-purpose communities 
that limit registration); Smith, supra note 48, at S468-71 (discussing ex-
clusion as a crude filter). 
121  See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (rev. ed. 
1971). 
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behavior that puts teeth in community rules.122 If ex post exclu-
sion is coupled with some transparency about the reasons for 
excluding participants, its existence gives members an incen-
tive to behave.123 
Ex ante pricing implements the usual understanding of a 
market—pay to play. Ex post pricing could be one of three 
things. First, the moderators may simply be extending credit to 
members or offering a free trial: those who do not pay up when 
billed will then be excluded. Second, it could be an honor-
system—pricing backed up by norms—in which participants 
who appreciate content or the community are encouraged to 
chip in to support it.124 Third, an ex post price could be a sanc-
tion for misbehavior, a punishment short of exclusion.125 
The choice between ex ante and ex post organization is tied 
to the choice of actor and thus to the incidence of implicit costs. 
Authors act ex ante; readers act ex post; moderators can do ei-
ther. If authors must pick ex ante a topic on a discussion board 
in which to post, the cost of posting is higher by the amount of 
effort involved in picking the right one. If moderators come 
along ex post and assign topics, authors bear less of a burden, 
and moderators bear more of one. Ex post organization is wide-
spread, as everyone who has ever liked a photo on Facebook or 
flagged an abusive YouTube comment can confirm. 
Regardless of who performs it, ex ante organization imposes 
a time cost on distribution because readers do not receive con-
tent until it has been organized. It may be more convenient to 
get your email from a mailing list in a daily digest, but you will 
miss out on fast-breaking conversations. Ex post organization 
can be faster-moving,126 but if the goal is to edit out unwanted 
content and to inculcate norms against it, leaving it in place for 
too long can be dangerous.127 Further, because ex post organiza-
                                                
122  See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 158-60; NG, supra note 15, at 97.  
123  For example, MetaFilter bans users who use posts for self-promotion. See 
Self Link, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/Self_Link [http://perma.cc/ 
V9GW-N7M4]. Note that this point holds only when users have enough 
invested in their community identities to make exclusion a meaningful 
sanction. 
124  But see Matthew Ingram, Why Online “Tip Jar”-Style Payment Systems 
Don’t Work, GIGAOM, May 11, 2011, http://gigaom.com/2011/05/11/why-onl 
ine-tip-jar-style-payment-systems-dont-work [http://perma.cc/APR9-M4U 
9]. 
125  See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). 
The difference between sanctions and prices is that sanctions attempt to 
defend a known line from transgression, rather than to measure the pre-
cise amount of harm. The temporal asymmetry provides a different way to 
distinguish sanctions and prices. Prices can be applied ex ante or ex post, 
but sanctions can only be applied ex post. 
126  See BELL, supra note 16, at 59 (praising The Guardian for its use of ex 
post moderation). 
127  See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 132. 
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tion can alter content or change its attributes, it can paradoxi-
cally impose search costs on participants. If you have ever 
found a web page through a search engine, only to lose it later 
when the page is no longer a prominent result for your original 
search term, you are a victim of a change in ex post filtration. 
An especially important aspect of ex post organization—
specifically of ex post deletion—is the spectrum from ephemer-
ality to permanence.128 By lowering the stakes, ephemerality 
promotes experimentation, risk-taking, and contingency.129 It 
also inhibits the formation of recognizable individual identities, 
which can ironically promote the development of a shared col-
lective ethos.130 More persistent content allows for norm-
enhancing community memory and for enduring individual 
reputations. The good that community members do lives on; so 
does the bad. 
Finally, effective social norms have both ex ante and ex post 
aspects. Ex post, the community expresses its approval or dis-
approval after a member has acted. Once someone has hit re-
ply-all for a personal aside, others can only glower and make 
pointed remarks. Ex ante social norms are those that members 
have internalized. With enough pointed remarks, members will 
learn to check themselves before they hit reply-all. 
4. Centrally / Distributedly 
Moderation decisions can be made either centrally by a sin-
gle moderator whose decision affects the entire community, or 
by multiple distributed moderators whose individual decisions 
affect only part of the community.131 For the most part, the 
consequences are as one would expect, and track the usual le-
gal debates about hierarchy and federalism. Centralized mod-
eration provides consistency: there is only one domain-name 
system. Distributed moderation promotes diversity: TMZ and 
PatientsLikeMe have different moderation policies, and should. 
Centralized moderation aggregates information: Google’s Page-
Rank algorithm draws on the entire structure of the Web. Dis-
tributed moderation relies on local knowledge: mailing list 
moderators have experience with their members’ sense of 
                                                
128  I am indebted to Sarah Jeong for pointing out this distinction. 
129  See Lee Knuttila, User Unknown: 4chan, Anonymity, and Contingency, 
FIRST MONDAY, Oct. 3, 2011, http://firstmonday.org/article/view/3665/3055 
[http://perma.cc/VP3A-57CS] (explaining how ephemerality of posts on 
4chan is responsible for "a unique, virtual ontological experience" and 
"fortuitous encounter[s]"). 
130  See Auerbach, supra note 55; Jay Allen, How Chan-Style Anonymous Cul-
ture Shapes #gamergate, STORIFY (Dec. 3, 2014), https://storify.com/a_man 
_in_black/how-chan-style-anonymous-culture-shapes-gamergate [https://p 
erma.cc/AFN4-PW9S]. 
131  Cf. Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic 
Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 716 (1986). 
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which messages are off-topic. Centralized moderation offers the 
ability to stop unwanted content and participants by creating a 
single checkpoint through which all must pass: a spammer 
kicked off of Facebook will not bother anyone else on Facebook. 
But chokepoints are also single points of failure: a spammer 
who gets through on Facebook can bother a lot of people. In 
comparison, distributed moderation offers more robustness and 
defense in depth. Centralized moderation offers a clear focal 
point for policy-making. If you don’t like my post, you know 
where to complain. Distributed moderation permits those with 
ideological differences to agree to disagree: if you don’t want to 
read my weblog, no one is putting it in front of you. 
In a sense, the choice between centralized and distributed 
exclusion is the choice between a single community and many. 
Similarly, the choice between centralized and distributed pric-
ing is the choice between a big-box retailer and a bazaar of 
many small merchants. It is in organization that the dichotomy 
between centralized and distributed moderation is the sharpest 
and the richest. A search engine is powerfully centralized; a 
social network devolves many organizational decisions to 
members who decide which friends to share and converse with. 
Taxonomies are centralized annotation; folksonomies of user-
assigned tags are distributed annotation.132 A top-ten list is a 
centralized filter; user-created playlists are distributed filters. 
But norms, by their nature, cannot be fully centralized. The 
power to adopt, shape, or reject them is always in the hands of 
members. The larger a community, the more competing voices 
and normative focal points it is likely to have. 
C. Community Characteristics (Adjectives) 
Just as one size does not fit all forms of moderation, one 
size does not fit all communities. Communities differ along 
many axes: the email system has different properties than 
Wikipedia, which has different properties than the comments 
section of a blog. Four characteristics of a community are par-
ticularly important in affecting the kinds of strategic behavior 
threatening it and the effectiveness of various types of modera-
tion: (1) the capacity of the infrastructure, (2) the size of the 
user community, (3) the distribution of ownership, and (4) the 
identifiability of participants. As with the adverbs above, these 
characteristics are mostly independent of each other.  
                                                
132  See Adam Mathes, Folksonomies—Cooperative Classification and Com-
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1. Infrastructure Capacity 
Infrastructure’s capacity—hard drive space, bandwidth, 
processing power, electric power, etc.—affects its ability to 
support members’ use. Where there is too much use for a given 
capacity, congestion results. Members find the system unpleas-
ant, unreliable, or unusable. In theory, it is almost always pos-
sible to add infrastructure, increase capacity, and reduce con-
gestion. But in practice, limited capacity affects the community 
in two ways. First, infrastructure costs money, so paying for it 
often requires pricing. Second, adding capacity takes time, 
which means congestion can be a major short-run problem, 
particularly in growing communities, even when long-run up-
grades are feasible.133 Friendster stumbled over technical is-
sues as it grew and was surpassed by MySpace,134 which stum-
bled in turn and was surpassed by Facebook.135 
A community in which capacity is a significant bottleneck 
looks very different from one in which it is not. With little ca-
pacity, the common-pool resource problem at the infrastructure 
level dominates, favoring moderation that closely regulates us-
age: exclusion, pricing, and deletion. As capacity increases, in-
frastructure recedes and content comes to the fore. There may 
still be cacophony, abuse, and manipulation, but these prob-
lems are more amenable to additive solutions, as captured in 
the slogan that the best remedy for bad speech is more speech. 
Annotation, filtration, synthesis, and norm-setting become 
comparatively more attractive. Where the balance between ca-
pacity constraints and cognitive constraints falls will vary by 
community. Ones in which members share rich multimedia 
content will experience congestion sooner and more painfully 
than ones in which members share short textual content.136 
The minimum practical unit of infrastructure is often suffi-
cient to enable a great deal of use, making it an important spe-
                                                
133  Infrastructure can be lumpy. When a community has outgrown its first 
server, it cannot easily add one-tenth of a second server. You cannot make 
a terabyte database simply by connecting a thousand gigabyte databases 
to each other. Cloud computing, however, is smoothing out infrastructure 
capacity by making it much easier to throw more computing resources at a 
problem, quickly and scalably. 
134  See Gary Rivlin, Wallflower at the Web Party, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/business/yourmoney/15friend.html 
[http://perma.cc/E8EE-K254]. 
135  See JULIA ANGWIN: STEALING MYSPACE: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE MOST 
POPULAR WEBSITE IN AMERICA 246-53 (2009). 
136  Compare, e.g., TWITCH, http://www.twitch.tv [http://perma.cc/5PG9-PKLB] 
(users share gaming videos), with YO, http://www.justyo.co [http://perma 
.cc/ZUC2-VSWM] (users share the word “Yo”). 
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cial case of abundance.137 For less than $250, you can buy a 
computer capable of carrying out two billion operations per se-
cond and with a hard drive capable of storing half a million 
full-text novels.138 Accordingly, a typical blog could receive 
thousands of comments a month without increasing its owner’s 
costs in the slightest. When participants bring their own infra-
structure—as in peer-to-peer systems—they may be able to 
support a substantial community without substantial effort. 
Growth out of this range creates an important scale transition: 
capacity becomes something the community must worry about, 
pay for, and safeguard. 
2. Community Size 
Closely related to infrastructure capacity is the number of 
members in a community. One important issue, discussed 
above, plays out at the infrastructure layer: more members 
means greater use and thus greater congestion.139 The more 
interesting consequences of increasing community size play out 
at the information layer. There are two offsetting effects for 
readers and authors. On the one hand, greater size catalyzes 
informational network effects in this two-sided market for at-
tention: readers would rather join a fan fiction community with 
ten thousand stories than one with ten, while authors would 
rather post to a fan fiction community with ten thousand read-
ers than one with ten. These effects are critical when a com-
munity starts. Like airplanes, communities need forward mo-
mentum to take off.140 On the other hand, a large community of 
authors will generate cacophony, making moderation increas-
ingly essential if readers are to find anything of value. Once a 
fan fiction community has ten thousand stories, it needs tags or 
a search function to separate the Harry/Draco slash141 from the 
                                                
137  See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emer-
gence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 
301-04 (2004). 
138  As of March 2015, a Dell Inspiron 14-inch laptop with a 500-gigabyte hard 
drive and a 2.16-gigahertz CPU cost $229.99 on sale from Dell.com. See 
New Inspiron 14 3000 Series Laptop, DELL, http://www.dell.com/us/p/inspi 
ron-14-3451-laptop/pd [http://perma.cc/8DWA-JXK6]. Also as of March 
2015, Amazon Web Services offers 750 hours of computing time per month 
and tens of gigabytes of storage for free. See AWS Free Tier, AMAZON, 
http://aws.amazon.com/free [http://perma.cc/X272-92C9]. 
139  This is the classic common-pool resource problem, and conventional wis-
dom recommends restricting community membership for just this reason. 
See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 38, at 91-92. 
140  The importance of catalyzing the initial roll-out of a community is a recur-
ring focus of books on community management. See, e.g., NG, supra note 
15, at 113-23. 
141 See, e.g., Blackie & Yoyo, [Tag: Harry/Draco], FUCK YEAH HP SLASH, http: 
//fuckyeahhpslash.tumblr.com/tagged/draco [http://perma.cc/D5V5-4FYR]. 
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Ronbledore,142 and stars or favorites or votes to filter the cream 
from the chaff. To summarize, the larger a community is, the 
better it is at competing with external alternatives, but the 
more internal moderation it requires. 
Moreover, community size interacts with the effectiveness 
of the forms of moderation. Growth is often notably unkind to 
social norms. It is easier to maintain any given norm in a 
smaller community than a larger one. As a community grows, 
it becomes easier for individuals and groups to resist a norm. 
This breakdown makes it harder to use social norms to moder-
ate large communities. A group of twenty can operate by un-
spoken consensus in a way that a group of twenty thousand 
cannot. Thus, decentralized moderation becomes increasingly 
attractive as the community grows because it fragments the 
community into smaller subcommunities that can maintain 
their own norms. Reddit’s subreddits, described below, are a 
superlative example. Exclusion can also be more difficult in a 
large community because it is easier for the unwanted to sneak 
in (for example, by stealing a password or giving a false name) 
and avoid immediate detection. 
On the other hand, pricing and organization can benefit 
from community size. Pricing at scale benefits from the salami-
slicing effect: a great many small payments can add up to a 
surprisingly large number. This is the key, for example, to ad-
vertising. Each pageview is good only for a small fraction of a 
penny, but those fractions add up fast. Organization can take 
advantage of the law of large numbers. Any individual modera-
tor’s assessment of an action’s value may or may not accurately 
reflect the community’s sense of value, but the average of a 
thousand moderators’ assessments is likely to express it fairly 
well. Thus, some techniques of synthesis become increasingly 
reliable as the community grows. Google’s assessment of Web 
pages’ importance, for example, synthesizes the individual de-
cisions of many millions of Web authors. The same is true of 
Amazon’s averages of user reviews, of Reddit’s upvoting algo-
rithms,143 and even of American Idol. 
Finally, community size shapes the way in which modera-
tion can best be executed. All of the verbs have costs that in-
crease with volume, and moderation requires greater and 
                                                
142  See estel, Weasley is Dumbledore Theory, If You Have Time to Spare, HAR-
RY POTTER’S PAGE DISCUSSION BOARDS (MAY 21, 2004, 11:31 AM), http://ww 
w.harrypotterspage.com/forums/index.php?s=&showtopic=393&view=find
post&p=17361 [http://perma.cc/Y8JG-WST8]; see generally Mallory Ort-
berg, Ronbledore Archive, THE TOAST, http://the-toast.net/tag/ronbledore 
[http://perma.cc/MWF4-BR9N]. 
143  Indeed, the Reddit algorithm has been tweaked to reflect the fact that 
assessments of content become more reliable as more people provide them. 
See infra note 273. 
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greater investments as a community grows. I have mentioned 
the scale transition that occurs when a community becomes big 
enough that it must start worrying about congestion. There is a 
second common transition, which occurs when a community 
becomes too big for one person to moderate without help. Pro-
fessional moderation becomes attractive, but paying those pro-
fessionals requires pricing. A third scale transition occurs when 
the community becomes too big for any reasonably sized group 
of humans to moderate entirely on their own. YouTube, for ex-
ample, would need three shifts of six thousand employees each, 
working around the clock, to prescreen all the videos uploaded 
to the site.144 Either decentralized or automatic moderation—
and quite possibly both—becomes a necessity.  
(1) Ownership Concentration 
Just as moderation can be centralized or distributed, so can 
ownership. The two questions are distinct. Wikipedia has cen-
tralized ownership (the Wikimedia Foundation) but decentral-
ized moderation. Bitcoin has centralized moderation (there is 
only one blockchain) but decentralized ownership (many differ-
ent people and organizations run computers that participate in 
the Bitcoin network).145 For the sake of clarity, I will refer to 
centralized ownership as concentrated, and decentralized own-
ership as dispersed. 
Concentrated ownership has one substantial advantage: 
there is only one owner whose account books must balance, ra-
ther than many. With dispersed ownership, if one of the many 
owners finds that she is absorbing a disproportionate share of 
the costs, she may simply withdraw. Put another way, concen-
trated owners can afford to be indifferent to the distribution of 
costs, since one part of the infrastructure may subsidize anoth-
er. The New York Times does not have to worry about separate-
ly accounting for the profit and loss of comments on each indi-
vidual article on its website. Distributed owners have no choice 
but to worry about the balance of payments. Such a system is 
far more likely to be stable when the owners are also partici-
pants, so that they subsidize themselves. Peer-to-peer file shar-
ing is the classic example of a case in which the rewards of par-
ticipation induce users to contribute their computing resources 
to the infrastructure. This self-organizing, self-provisioning as-
                                                
144  See Statistics, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2015) [https://perma.cc/ZG7H-CL5J] (“100 hours of 
video are uploaded to YouTube every minute.”). Assuming each moderator 
can watch one video at a time, watching every video would therefore re-
quire 6,000 moderators working simultaneously, all the time. 
145  See generally ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCK-
ING DIGITAL CURRENCIES (2014) (describing Bitcoin). 
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pect of dispersed ownership can be particularly robust in com-
munities that do not rely heavily on exclusion or pricing. 
Both forms of ownership can be useful in resisting attacks. 
On the one hand, dispersed ownership can align incentives by 
allocating the costs of heavy use to those users’ own portions of 
the infrastructure.146 For example, in peer-to-peer file-sharing 
networks, uers who are only willing to pay their ISPs for low-
bandwitdh connections can download less than users who are 
willing to pay more for faster connections. On the other hand, a 
concentrated owner can mount a coordinated defense against 
denial of service attacks. The other participants have no infra-
structure of their own at risk. This point is more important 
than it may seem at first because popularity can be an unin-
tentional denial-of-service attack.147 If George Takei tweets 
about your website, your server might crash.148 But if your Fa-
cebook Page goes viral, Facebook will take care of it without 
blinking. 
The choice to concentrate or disperse ownership also affects 
the political economy of the choice among moderation tech-
niques. Owners can use their power over the infrastructure 
layer to make policy at the content layer, for good and for ill. 
This is why Facebook had years of controversy over banning 
breastfeeding photos: as infrastructure owner, it made and ap-
plied a broad anti-nudity moderation policy.149 Manipulation to 
favor the owner’s interests is the constant fear.150 Distributed 
ownership gives community members more power to force 
democratic moderation decisions. To take a simple example, 
compare the openness of the web with the walled garden that is 
Facebook. For another, compare Bitcoin with Paypal. 
                                                
146  This is the pattern described by Smith in his study of the open-field semi-
commons, where farming ownership was divided into strips. See Smith, 
supra note 48. He explains that the boundaries of privately held portions 
can be set to prevent strategic behavior—in the case of the open fields, to 
make it hard for shepherds to concentrate grazing harms on particular 
owners. 
147  See Slashdot Effect, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes 
/slashdot-effect [http://perma.cc/U3N4-ZEPK]. 
148  See Anna Leach, Mr. Sulu Causes DDoS Panic After Posting Link on Fa-
cebook, THE REGISTER, June 8, 2012, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/06 
/08/takei_ddos_facebook_fans [http://perma.cc/M5KW-NJXA]. 
149  See Soraya Chemaly, #FreeTheNipple: Facebook Changes Breastfeeding 
Mothers Photo Policy, HUFFINGTON POST, June 9, 2014, http://www.huffing 
tonpost.com/soraya-chemaly/freethenipple-facebook- changes_b_5473467 
.html [http://perma.cc/8976-4D37]. 
150  See, e.g., Christian Sandvig, Corrupt Personalization, SOCIAL MEDIA COL-
LECTIVE, June 26, 2014, http://socialmediacollective.org/2014/06/26/corrupt 
-personalization [http://perma.cc/AJ7M-Q4ZP]. 
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The final community characteristic is the distinction be-
tween identity and anonymity. At one extreme, participants in 
an online community could be completely identified, bringing 
with them a complete biography of their online and offline 
lives. At the other, they could be completely anonymous.151 
Compare Google+, which launched with a strict, stringently 
enforced, and much-criticized “real names” policy,152 with 
4chan, where “most posts . . . are disconnected from any identi-
ty.”153 There are many gradations in between.154 Participants 
could have identities that mostly match their offline lives, but 
in which the details are potentially questionable, as in an 
online dating service where participants sometimes lie about 
their height.155 They could have rich and persistent but avow-
edly fictitious identities, as in virtual worlds where they play 
the same avatar thirty hours a week for years. They could have 
stable but thin identities, as on a discussion board that uses 
pseudonyms and keeps users’ real names and email addresses 
secret. They could have thin identities purely as a matter of 
convention, as in some blogs’ comment sections, where a com-
menter can pick a fresh display name with each comment. Par-
ticipants could even have one level of identifiability at the in-
frastructure level (supply a valid email address to sign up) but 
a different level at the content layer (that email address is hid-
den from other participants). Whatever its nature, the most 
important role of identity is creating stable reputations 
through time so that others can link past behavior to a present 
identity.156 
All four verbs of moderation can tap into identity. Exclusion 
absolutely depends on it; without identity, the distinction be-
tween “outsiders” and “insiders” collapses. You can identify the 
                                                
151  See, e.g., E. Gabriella Coleman, Our Weirdness Is Free, TRIPLE CANOPY 
(Jan. 2012), http://www.canopycanopycanopy.com/contents/our_weirdness 
_is_free [http://perma.cc/DV5P-AYX3] (discussing “the sublimation of 
identity” in hacker collective Anonymous). 
152  See Jillian York, A Case for Pseudonyms, DEEPLINKS, July 29, 2011, https: 
//www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/07/case-pseudonyms [https://perma.cc/RU9U 
-DCPM] (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
153  Michael S. Bernstein et al., 4chan and /b/: An Analysis of Anonymity and 
Ephemerality in a Large Online Community, PROC. INT’L CONF. ON WEB-
LOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 3 (2011) (emphasis added); see also Auerbach, su-
pra note 55. 
154  See generally FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 21-36 (presenting graph-
ical grammar of reputation). 
155  See Christian Rudder, The Big Lies People Tell in Online Dating, OK-
TRENDS (July 7, 2010), http://blog.okcupid.com/index.php/the-biggest-lies-
in-online-dating [http://perma.cc/7W4R-YVQ9]. 
156  See, e.g., FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 17 (describing “The Reputa-
tion Virtuous Cycle”). 
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unwanted outsiders and blacklist them or identify the wanted 
insiders and whitelist them, but both versions require some 
notion of identity.157 As anyone who has moderated a blog’s 
comments can testify, this is a huge problem for communities 
that are open to new and unknown members from the Internet 
at large. There is often no way to tell that a “new” commenter 
is actually an old and well-known miscreant, back from a ban 
for another round of malice.158 
In theory, pricing could be identity-free—transactional and 
transitory. But in practice, any explicit pricing system will de-
pend on some non-trivial identity infrastructure, such as a 
credit card processor. Having a credit card number is not nec-
essarily a guarantee of anything, but it is a significant identity 
hurdle, and one that many online businesses, for example, use 
to create some minimal level of accountability among users. 
More complex pricing builds on persistent identity. “For $10, 
you can post as often as you want for a year” requires a notion 
of “you” that will be stable for a year. 
Organization can both piggyback on and produce identity. 
Filtering and deletion both often treat the identity of an author 
as a significant data point. Most anti-spam systems, for exam-
ple, use whitelisting to allow trusted senders’ emails to bypass 
the spam check altogether. In reputation systems, participants 
provide annotations on each other’s actions, and those annota-
tions become part of one’s community identity.159 eBay’s feed-
back system, in which buyers and sellers use feedback left by 
others to decide whom to trust, is an example of reputational 
annotation. Slashdot’s multi-level moderation system has sev-
eral variables that use others’ ratings of one’s actions to decide 
how much power one will have to moderate in the future.160 
It is well known that identifiability plays a significant role 
in setting social norms.161 Persistent reputations make it possi-
ble for participants to build credibility as respected elders with-
in the community.162 They make it possible to hold participants 
accountable for their actions, enabling the effective monitoring 
and graduated sanctions beloved by commons scholars.163 By 
contrast, anonymity enables consequence-free norm violation 
                                                
157  See generally PREECE, supra note 15, at 96-97. 
158  KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 138. 
159  See generally FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16. 
160  See Lampe, supra note 84. 
161  Lessig famously described the difference in tone between two class news-
groups, one anonymous and one with stronger identity; the anonymous 
one was hijacked by a malicious flamer. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 102-
06 (2006). See generally Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. 
L. REV. 501 (2013). 
162  See, e.g., Warnick, supra note 20, at 103-04. 
163  See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 155-57; OSTROM, supra note 38, at 
94-100; see generally FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16. 
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and can undermine the appearance of reciprocity among real 
human beings. But stronger identity is not always better. 
Sometimes it creates a badge for misbehavior: a leaderboard is 
an invitation to fame-seeking cheaters. Making participants 
more anonymous (for example, by resetting a server) can drive 
trolls away because it deprives them of the opportunity to 
make a (bad) name for themselves. 
Paradoxically, both identity and its opposite—anonymity—
can be expensive to establish. Externally produced identity re-
quires participants to prove facts about themselves, which can 
cost both time and money. It also requires owners and modera-
tors to be prepared to check these assertions, which too is cost-
ly. Internally produced reputation systems require participants 
to take the time to learn about, comment on, and rate each oth-
er.164 An important question for online communities is who con-
trols these socially constructed identities: users themselves, the 
community, or infrastructure owners.165 Anonymity might 
seem cheaper, but genuinely effacing participants’ identities 
requires some significant effort—deleting log files, stripping 
out snooping software, and taking action against participants 
who “out” one another’s offline identities.  
Finally, identity can be the enemy of privacy, for good and 
for bad. Divulging information about oneself is itself a cost. 
Privacy is virtually a precondition for some kinds of speech. 
Some conversations simply cannot take place in public. This 
phenomenon can be good: think of therapeutic conversations on 
a discussion board for adult victims of childhood abuse. It can 
also be bad: think of virulently misogynistic and racist conver-
sations on a law student board. 
Two forms of abuse are characteristically tied to the misuse 
of identity. Impersonation—the hijacking of another’s identi-
ty—requires that participants have recognizable identities to 
hijack.166 And sock puppetry—creating fake personas to create 
the false appearance of support for a position—requires that 
the community recognize personas as distinct participants in 
the first place.167 Both become possible when a community ac-
                                                
164  FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 223-41. 
165  See, e.g., Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark Law and the Social Construc-
tion of Trust: Creating the Legal Framework for Online Identity, 83 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 1733 (2005); Omer Tene, Me, Myself, and I: Aggregated and Dis-
aggregated Identities on Social Networking Service, 8 J. INT’L COM. L. & 
TECH. 118 (2013). 
166  See, e.g., Dylan Loeb McClain, Chess Group Officials Accused of Using 
Internet to Hurt Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007. 
167  See, e.g., Simon Owens, The Battle to Destroy Wikipedia’s Biggest Sock-
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cepts claims of identity that it is not capable of properly vali-
dating. 
III. Case Studies 
This Part discusses four case studies to give a feel for how 
moderation can play out in practice.168 Two (Wikipedia and 
MetaFilter) are hard-won successes. One (the Los Angeles 
Times wikitorial) was an abject failure. The fourth (Reddit) is 
deeply ambivalent—an immensely popular site with an im-
mensely loyal user base that is nonetheless also responsible for 
some notoriously destructive episodes. 
A. Wikipedia 
Other than the Internet itself, Wikipedia is the preeminent 
example of successful online collaboration.169 It started as an 
offshoot of Nupedia, one of several attempts in the 1990s and 
early 2000s to create an online encyclopedia through volunteer 
contributions.170 Nupedia relied on peer-reviewed contributions 
from experts—centralized, transparent, ex ante human exclu-
sion and organization—but its founders, Jimmy Wales and 
Larry Sanger, were frustrated at the slow pace of contribu-
tions. Sanger’s friend Ben Kovitz suggested that Nupedia use a 
wiki for initial collaboration on articles that would then go 
through the full editorial review.171 And thus, on January 15, 
2001, Wikipedia was born.172 It took off so rapidly that “when 
the server hosting Nupedia crashed in September 2003 (with 
little more than twenty-four complete articles and seventy-four 
more in progress) it was never restored.”173 Today the English-
language Wikipedia alone has over four and a half million arti-
cles. Twenty-three million registered users and countless 
anonymous ones have made more than seven hundred million 
edits.174 One meta-analysis concluded that Wikipedia has “a 
valuation in the tens of billions of dollars, a one-time replace-
                                                
168  Other case studies illustrate the principles as well. See, e.g., FARMER & 
GLASS, supra note 16, at 243-77 (Yahoo! Answers); Grimmelmann, Semi-
commons, supra note 37, at 2831-39 (USENET). 
169  See generally PHOEBE AYERS, CHARLES MATTHEWS & BEN YATES, HOW WIK-
IPEDIA WORKS: AND HOW YOU CAN BE A PART OF IT (2008); ANDREW DALBY, 
THE WORLD AND WIKIPEDIA: HOW WE ARE EDITING REALITY (2009); 
JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83; LIH, supra note 11; JOSEPH REAGLE, GOOD 
FAITH COLLABORATION: THE CULTURE OF WIKIPEDIA (2010). 
170  See LIH, supra note 11, at 32-41. 
171  REAGLE, supra note 169, at 39. See generally BO LEUF & WARD CUNNING-
HAM, THE WIKI WAY: ONLINE COLLABORATION ON THE WEB (2001) (describ-
ing wiki technology). 
172  See LIH, supra note 11, at 60-67. 
173  REAGLE, supra note 169, at 40; see also JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 11 
(explaining that twenty thousand articles were created in the first year). 
174  See Wikipedia:Statistics, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedi 
a:Statistics [http://perma.cc/7LC2-GYLC] (last visited Jan. 20, 2015). 
38
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 17 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol17/iss1/2
 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 17 
 
80 
ment cost of $6.6 billion with an annual updating cost of $630 
million, and consumer benefit in the hundreds of billions of dol-
lars.”175 
A wiki is merely a tool: switching from Microsoft Word to 
MediaWiki will not make you a master encyclopedist, just as 
Diderot and d'Alembert’s success in creating the Encyclopédie 
was not a matter of having better pens than other philosophes. 
Rather, the technical switch from Nupedia to Wikipedia mat-
tered because it enabled a social shift—dropping the exclusion 
and switching from ex ante to ex post organization. Editors 
could now draw on a much larger pool of potential contributors 
and improve each other’s work incrementally, iteratively, and 
interactively.176 These changes dramatically increased the 
community size and dramatically reduced the implicit price of 
participation. As new authors added more articles and im-
proved existing ones, they quickly established strong, positive 
norms. The initial success served as an advertisement for fur-
ther participants and participation in a virtuous cycle of 
growth. 
Wikipedia’s system of moderation is sophisticated and intri-
cate, but its two basic commitments have remained distributed 
organization and strong social norms. The two are in signifi-
cant tension.177 Most of Wikipedia’s moderation choices can be 
understood in terms of the difficult task of sustaining norm-
based “soft security,” which works through “group dynamics 
rather than hard-coded limits” in a massive community with 
millions of members.178 “But Wikipedia’s openness isn’t a mis-
take; it’s the source of its success. A community solves prob-
lems that official leaders wouldn’t even know were there.”179 
                                                
175  Jonathan Band & Jonathan Gerafi, Wikipedia’s Economic Value (Oct. 7, 
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338563 [http:// 
perma.cc/58SJ-VZV7]. 
176  These are classic features of successful open source collaboration. See gen-
erally STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004). BENKLER, su-
pra note 69, describes their broader applicability. 
177  See REAGLE, supra note 169, at 83-88; Eric Goldman, Wikipedia’s Labor 
Squeeze and Its Consequences, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 157 (2010); 
Andrew George, Avoiding Tragedy in the Wiki-Commons, 12 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. no. 8 (2007), http://www.vjolt.net/vol12/issue4/v12i4_a2-George.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/HNV9-9GXU]; Aaron Halfaker et al., The Rise and De-
cline of an Open Collaboration System: How Wikipedia’s Reaction to Popu-
larity Is Causing Its Decline, 57 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 664 (2012). 
178  AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 45; see also Soft Security, MEATBALL WIKI, 
http://meatballwiki.org/wiki/SoftSecurity [http://perma.cc/G78W-9G3T]; 
Jimmy Wales, Foreword to LIH, supra note 11, at xvii-xviii (“[T]rying to 
make sure that nobody can hurt anyone else actually eliminates all the 
opportunities for trust.”); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTER-
NET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 127-48 (2008). 
179  Aaron Swartz, Who Runs Wikipedia?, RAW THOUGHT (Sept. 7, 2006), 
http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/whorunswikipedia [http://perma.cc 
/6MNH-2YYZ]. Swartz’s six-part series on Wikipedia’s self-moderation is 
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The power of Wikipedia’s first commitment, to distributed 
organization, is by now well established.180 Wikipedia uses it 
with remarkable flexibility. The best Wikipedia articles are 
synthesized from the contributions of thousands of authors, 
and the hyperlinks between articles are a beautiful use of an-
notation.181 Organizationally, Wikipedia uses pages, subpages, 
lists, lists of lists, categories, categories of categories, sidebars, 
standardized templates, and even a special-purpose markup 
and programming language, all tools that enable the richly 
multimedia and complexly interlinked web of knowledge.182 
These are ex ante filtering carried out by authors and modera-
tors; they split the flood of information into manageable 
streams. Further, Wikipedia offers readers ex post filtering 
though its search engine.183 It also enjoys additional filtering 
simply as a consequence of being openly available and searcha-
ble on the Web: if you want to learn about widgets, you need 
only Google “wikipedia widget.” 184 
Wikipedia’s pricing strategy similarly supports large-scale 
participation. Just as it is open to anyone, it is also free to read 
and to edit. Wikipedia’s socially beneficial mission allows it to 
function as a charitable organization. The Wikimedia Founda-
tion, which subsists on donations, keeps the site free for au-
thors, readers, and moderators. Implicitly, the use of a wiki 
makes it easy, at least in theory, for anyone to dive in and 
make edits. Indeed, Wikipedia now prohibits undisclosed paid 
editing because it is worried about incentives for manipula-
tion.185 
Wikipedia’s second commitment, to positive social norms, is 
even richer and more complex. The basic attitude of epistemic 
humility is summed up in the two mottoes “[adopt a] neutral 
point of view” and “assume [that others are acting in] good 
                                                                                                         
well worth reading, and holds up quite well eight years later. See also 
James Grimmelmann, Seven Wikipedia Fallacies, THE LABORATORIUM 
(Aug. 27, 2006), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2006/08/27/seven_wikiped 
ia_fallacies_1 [http://perma.cc/C3E8-BRWY]. 
180  See generally WEBER, supra note 176; Benkler, supra note 39. 
181  For example, as of November 3, 2014, the readable and informative article 
on West Point was roughly 13,000 words long and had been edited 3,815 
times by 1,252 editors. 
182  See generally AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 68-298 (describing Wikipe-
dia’s technical organization). 
183  See id. at 60-65. Another useful reader filtering technique is the “watch-
list,” which provides an editor with a chronological list of edits to which-
ever pages she wishes to track. See Help:Watching pages, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Watching_pages [http://perma.cc/T3B2-V 
8CS]. 
184  See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 65-76.  
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faith.”186 Editors are expected to adhere to these attitudinal 
norms while editing pages in order to advance an extensive list 
of substantive standards for articles (they are expected, for ex-
ample, to make entries verifiable by citing reliable sources187 
and to craft entries of appropriate length188) and are expected 
to follow extensive procedural rules189 (for example, the proce-
dures for deleting a controversial entry190). Reproducing these 
norms requires an immense amount of work.191 In fact, simply 
learning the social ropes of Wikipedia can be notoriously dis-
couraging to new members.192 The endless restatement of Wik-
ipedian norms—often in the process of accusing others of vio-
lating them—testifies to just what a big job this is in a commu-
nity the size of Wikipedia.193 Indeed, Wikipedia has an exten-
sive parallel architecture of talk pages devoted to conversations 
about Wikipedia and its norms.194 The norms of discourse here 
are rich. There is even a tradition of Wikipedia humor.195 
Wikipedia does not run on exhortation alone. Beneath the 
surface, its moderators use the other verbs of moderation 
extensively to sustain positive norms. The most important 
decision is structural, and so deeply embedded in the idea of a 
wiki that it can be invisible: Wikipedia is highly modular, and 
its editorial work factors into loosely coupled subunits.196 
Wikipedia would not work—it could not work—if it consisted of 
a single massive webpage that only one person at a time could 
                                                
186  See REAGLE, supra note 169, at 45-71 (describing Wikipedia’s “collabora-
tive culture”); see generally Wikipedia: Civility, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikip 
edia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Civility [http://perma.cc/FS37-ZP5H]; Wikipedia: 
Neutral Point of View, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia: 
Neutral_point_of_view [http://perma.cc/JMA4-9Z59]. Dariusz Jemielniak 
argues that Wikipedia’s policy against personal attacks is central to its 
culture. See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 17-18. 
187  Wikipedia: Verifiability, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia 
:Verifiability [http://perma.cc/L425-K4DG]. 
188  Wikipedia: Article Size, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia 
:Article_size [http://perma.cc/CY68-3V94]. 
189  See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 363-81 (summarizing policies). 
190  Wikipedia: Deletion Process, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki 
pedia:Deletion_process [http://perma.cc/8P7A-NGXJ]. 
191  See generally JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83; REAGLE, supra note 169. 
192  See generally E. GABRIELLA COLEMAN, CODING FREEDOM: THE ETHICS AND 
AESTHETICS OF HACKING 123-60 (2013) (describing the process of norm 
transmission in a community of open-source hackers). 
193  See, e.g., JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83. 
194  See, e.g., id. at 92-96. 
195  See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 350-53; REAGLE, supra note 169, at 
68-70. 
196  On modularity in general, see HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE 
ARTIFICIAL (1969). For a powerful application of modularity to open collab-
orative projects, see Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, The Architecture 
of Participation: Does Code Architecture Mitigate Free Riding in the Open 
Source Development Model?, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1116 (2006). 
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edit. Instead, it is split into different linguistic versions,197 into 
WikiProjects for specific topics,198 and into individual pages 
(each with its own associated Talk page for discussion).199 For 
one thing, this factoring allows different editors to work in 
parallel, making independent decisions. For another, it allows 
different groups of editors to work in parallel, creating smaller 
and more cohesive subcommunities with a more localized sense 
of purpose and stronger shared norms.200 
In sustaining its collaborative norms, Wikipedia also makes 
subtle and judicious compromises on openness, using deletion 
and exclusion in controversial but probably necessary ways. 
Take a simple act of vandalism akin to the one that brought 
down the Los Angeles Times wikitorial: changing the Wikipedia 
page on the Iraq War to say “FUCK USA.” Wikipedia has en-
tire projects devoted to fighting vandalism.201 Some users sign 
up for a “recent changes patrol” or “counter-vandalism unit” 
and watch for suspicious changes to attractive targets, like po-
litically controversial pages.202 When they see an obvious act of 
vandalism, they revert the edit and restore the page to its pre-
vious state. This is ex post, distributed, transparent, human 
deletion. Other users run bots that watch for recent changes 
and revert changes that are especially likely to be vandalism, 
as when a page goes from thousands of words to two.203 This is 
ex post, distributed, transparent, automatic deletion. These an-
ti-vandalism efforts are why, despite the large number of bogus 
edits daily, most Wikipedia articles are in good shape most of 
the time. Vandals who don’t succeed quickly tend to give up 
quickly.204 
                                                
197  See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 407-18; LIH, supra note 11, at 133-67. 
198  See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 212-16. 
199  See generally id. at 99-117; Almila Akdag Shah et al., Generating Ambigu-
ities: Mapping Category Names of Wikipedia to UDC Class Numbers, in 
CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 63-77 (Geert Lovink & Na-
thaniel Tkacz eds., 2011) (describing complexities in Wikipedia’s classifi-
cation systems). 
200  This is an example of an effect described by Howard Rheingold: online, 
small and dispersed communities of interest can find each other for col-
laborative purposes. See generally RHEINGOLD, supra note 20. 
201  See Wikipedia: Cleaning up Vandalism, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/Wikipedia:Cleaning_up_vandalism [http://perma.cc/H8WP-5NKS]. 
202  Wikipedia: Recent Changes Patrol, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Wikipedia:Recent_changes_patrol [http://perma.cc/4DKH-UJCB]; Wik-
ipedia: Counter-Vandalism Unit, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Wikipedia:Counter-Vandalism_Unit [http://perma.cc/UFZ3-LTET]. 
203  See Geiger, supra note 102; Jesse Hicks, This Machine Kills Trolls, THE 
VERGE, Feb. 18, 2014, http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/18/5412636/this-
machine-kills-trolls-how-wikipedia-robots-snuff-out-vandalism [http://per 
ma.cc/5HGX-DB2P]. Bots are also useful for repetitive tasks such spell-
checking and filling basic articles with standardized information (e.g., 
county demographics). See LIH, supra note 11, at 99-106. 
204  See ZITTRAIN, supra note 178, at 138-39. 
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Wikipedia has sterner stuff in store when reversion isn’t 
enough. Some articles are “semi-protected”: only logged-in us-
ers can edit them, thus adding enough of a cost barrier to deter 
casual vandals.205 Highly controversial articles may be “fully 
protected”: only the much smaller group of administrators can 
make changes to them.206 Protection switches from ex post to ex 
ante deletion, trading off openness for better protection against 
cacophony, abuse, and manipulation. Protection is regularly 
used not merely to prevent norm-defying users from making 
changes, but also to reassert norms without aliening users by 
establishing “cooling off” periods.207 
When protection doesn’t work, Wikipedia can also act 
against users themselves. Those who engage in large-scale 
vandalism or serious abuse, or who flout other important com-
munity policies, can be banned. Their accounts are prevented 
from making any edits at all, either to a few specific pages, or 
in severe cases, to Wikipedia as a whole.208 Since there are also 
anonymous users and banned users who return with sock-
puppet accounts, Wikipedia also blocks anonymous edits from 
some IP addresses entirely.209 Banning and blocking are cen-
tralized, ex post, human, transparent exclusion. These methods 
are imposed by administrators through a review process that 
includes appeals. 
As this discussion suggests, Wikipedia has a complicated 
relationship to identity. On the one hand, the fundamental 
“anyone can edit” policy acts as a strong check on pressures to 
prevent all anonymous edits.210 Indeed, it gives Wikipedia a 
                                                
205 Wikipedia: Protection Policy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki 
pedia:Protection_policy [http://perma.cc/BV9Q-DT2A]. 
206  Id. Currently, there are about 1,400 administrators on the English-
language Wikipedia, who are selected through discussion and voting by 
other Wikipedians. See Wikipedia: Administrators, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wi 
kipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators [http://perma.cc/X7VB-7F95]. 
207  Wikipedia: Banning Policy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikip 
edia:Banning_policy [http://perma.cc/FM6L-SN33]. 
208  See R. Stuart Geiger & David Ribes, The Work of Sustaining Order in 
Wikipedia: The Banning of a Vandal, PROC. ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER 
SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK (2010), http://www.stuartgeiger.com/paper 
s/cscw-sustaining-order-wikipedia.pdf [http://perma.cc/7Y46-AGEP]. 
209  Wikipedia: Blocking IP Addresses, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Wikipedia:Blocking_IP_addresses [http://perma.cc/D37W-2RJM]. In 2014, 
Wikipedia blocked an IP address associated with the House of Represent-
atives from anonymous edits because of “disruptive editing.” See Abby 
Phillip, Wikipedia Blocks Anonymous Edits (and Trolling) from a Con-




210  See Wikipedia: Introduction, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki 
pedia:Introduction  [http://perma.cc/2Q2J-DEEU] (“Don't be afraid to ed-
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strong (though much-criticized211) anti-expert ethos, in which 
offline credentials are nominally considered irrelevant to one’s 
authority as an editor.212 On the other hand, for registered us-
ers, Wikipedia is a surveillance society: user pages track one’s 
complete editing history.213 Reputation plays a major role in 
the Wikipedia community. One is expected to have a substan-
tial history of numerous productive edits to be accepted as a 
trusted voice.214 Editors also celebrate each other’s work, indi-
vidually with “barnstars” (images awarded for feats of hard but 
valuable work),215 and collectively by making especially good 
articles “featured” on the Wikipedia homepage,216 thereby us-
ing reputation to fuel positive norms. 
Relatedly, transparency is a key aspirational virtue. Be-
cause every edit is logged, Wikipedians are expected to explain 
and if necessary defend their actions in sometimes excruciating 
detail. The process of being given administrator privileges can 
involve a harrowing examination of one’s editing history, often 
by other editors with an axe to grind.217 Decisions on every-
thing from whether to rename a page to whether to ban a user 
are also debated publicly, often ad nauseam. Opacity is anath-
ema. A persistent, if overblown, criticism of administrators is 
that they have access to private mailing lists.218 Wikipedia’s 
                                                                                                         
it—anyone can edit almost every page, and we are encouraged to be 
bold.”). 
211  See, e.g., DALBY, supra note 169, at 50-81 (collecting criticisms); Criticism 
of Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Wikipe 
dia [http://perma.cc/5UE4-T2PR]. But see Clay Shirky, Larry Sanger, Citi-
zendium, and the Problem of Expertise, MANY 2 MANY (Sept. 18, 2006) (ar-
guing that that Wikipedia succeded where Nupedia failed because it 
avoided the institutional overhead costs created by deference to experts). 
212  See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 106-124 (arguing that Wikipedia trusts 
procedures rather than people). Famously, Philip Roth was considered not 
to be a reliable source when changing an entry to describe the origins of 
his novel, The Human Stain. See Phillip Roth, An Open Letter to Wikipe-
dia, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/bo 
oks/page-turner/an-open-letter-to-wikipedia [http://perma.cc/TN3T-KB7G]. 
213  See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 87-99 (discussing control through track-
ing); see also Geiger, supra note 102, at 83-92 (describing extensive con-
troversy over a bot that added signatures to users’ comments on talk pag-
es). 
214  See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 39-41. 
215  See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 333-34. Wikipedia: Barnstars, WIK-
IPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Barnstars [http://perma.cc/7 
LQU-L3RV]. For the history and nomenclature of Barnstars, see Barn-
Star, MEATBALLWIKI, http://meatballwiki.org/wiki/BarnStar [http://perma 
.cc/AM8X-YEP3]. 
216  See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 227-28; Wikipedia: Featured Articles, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Featured_articles [http: 
//perma.cc/H775-JTP5]. 
217  See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 37-50. 
218  See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 50-58; Ayelet Oz, “Move Along Now, 
Nothing to See Here”: The Private Discussion Spheres of Wikipedia (Aug. 
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use of open-source software and freely licensed contributions 
also mean that forking is always a possibility.219 
Wikipedia’s dispute resolution system is complex and multi-
tiered, as might be expected from a project as capacious and 
contentious as creating a global encyclopedia. Officially, at 
least, it tries to operate by consensus.220 Initially, many differ-
ences of opinion are simply argued over until one side or the 
other is either persuaded or gives up.221 Other questions, such 
as whether to delete an article or how best to describe a politi-
cal issue neutrally, may be put to a vote of all interested Wik-
ipedians. The votes themselves are usually non-binding; they 
serve instead as a tool for measuring consensus. When that 
doesn’t suffice, both a Mediation Committee and an Arbitration 
Committee exist to hear disputes through a relatively formal 
multi-level process.222 Beyond that, the nonprofit Wikimedia 
Foundation, which oversees Wikipedia in the role of owner,223 
can ultimately step in, although it generally tries to avoid be-
                                                                                                         
29, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1726450 
[http://perma.cc/U2MZ-GADA]. 
219  In a fork, a group of participants makes a copy of another shared, freely-
licensed informational resource and work on the newly independent copy 
rather than on the original. See Andrew Famigletti, The Right to Fork: A 
Historical Survey of De/Centralization in Wikipedia, in CRITICAL POINT OF 
VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 296-308 (Geert Lovink & Nathaniel Tkacz eds., 
2011); Nathaniel Tkacz, The Politics of Forking Paths, in CRITICAL POINT 
OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 94-107 (Geert Lovink & Nathaniel Tkacz 
eds., 2011). The most famous fork of Wikipedia is Citizendium, created by 
Wikipedia co-founder Larry Sanger to give more deference to credentialed 
experts. See Timothy B. Lee, Citzendium Turns Five, But the Wikipedia 
Fork is Dead in the Water, ARS TECHNICA. Oct. 27, 2011, http://arstechnica 
.com/tech-policy/2011/10/five-year-old-wikipedia-fork-is-dead-in-the-water 
[http://perma.cc/5ZPU-UNYV] (discussing history of Citizendium). 
220  See REAGLE, supra note 169, at 97-115. 
221  See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 76-81 (describing different “trajectories” 
that conflicts on Wikipedia can take). 
222  See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 81-84; David Hoffman & Salil Mehra, 
Wikitruth Through Wikiorder, 59 EMORY L.J. 151 (2010) (arguing that 
Wikipedia’s dispute resolution procedures work mainly by weeding out 
problematic users who will not adhere to Wikipedia’s discourse norms); 
Sara Gwendolyn Ross, Your Day in ‘Wiki-Court’: ADR, Fairness, and Jus-
tice in Wikipedia’s Global Community (Osgoode Legal Studies, Research 
Paper No. 56, 2014).  
223  See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 447-53; Mayo Fuster Morell, The 
Wikimedia Foundation and the Governance of Wikipedia’s Infrastructure, 
in CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 325-41 (Geert Lovink & 
Nathaniel Tkacz eds., 2011); see generally Jyh-An Lee, Organizing the 
Unorganized: The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in the Commons Com-
munities, 50 JURIMETRICS 275 (2010) (arguing that the nonprofit organiza-
tional form presents distinctive trust advantages for stewards of com-
mons-based communities). 
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coming involved in specific issues.224 Wikipedia takes its com-
munity democracy as seriously as it can. 
Wikipedia is a sprawling, messy, and often bureaucratic or-
ganization. It combines norm-setting, exclusion, pricing, and 
organization. Its moderation is human, automatic, transparent, 
opaque, ex ante, ex post, centralized, and distributed. Its partic-
ipants fight about everything—from the Shakespeare author-
ship question to the choice between “Gdańsk” and “Danzig”225—
at great length. These endless wrangles are not simply wasted 
breath, or signs of a community about to crack apart. They are 
part and parcel of why Wikipedia works. The free encyclopedia 
is not free: its participants create it at great expense of time 
and effort. Not all of that effort goes into research and writing. 
The greater part of it is spent on the community-oriented work 
that actually holds Wikipedia together—the work of modera-
tion. 
B. The Los Angeles Times Wikitorial 
The Los Angeles Times ignored all of this. Like Wikipedia, it 
was open to the world, but it had none of Wikipedia's devices 
for helping the well intentioned collaborate while keeping the 
ne’er-do-wells at bay. Unlike Wikipedia, the Times had no way 
to block persistently harmful users—not even a mechanism to 
track and identify the worst abusers. Unlike Wikipedia, it had 
no back channel for users to converse and develop community 
norms226 or dispute-resolution mechanisms to contain conflict, 
and the experiment failed long before they could evolve. The 
Times forced users with strongly divergent beliefs on a contro-
versial topic together, exacerbating normative conflict.227 It 
brought them together for a one-off project, with no long-term 
reputations to recognize trustworthy members of the communi-
ty. It had no dedicated cadre of administrators cleaning up de-
structive edits. Vandals who saw the broken windows decided 
to storm the front door. 
                                                
224  See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 125-44 (describing the sometimes 
fraught relationship between the Foundation and the Wikipedia commu-
nity); Shun-Ling Chen, The Wikimedia Foundation and the Self-
Governing Community: A Dynamic Relationship Under Constant Negotia-
tion, in CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 351-69 (Geert Lov-
ink & Nathaniel Tkacz eds., 2011). Previously, Jimmy Wales acted as “be-
nevolent dictator” before voluntarily sidelining himself to reduce contro-
versy. See REAGLE, supra note 169, at 117-35 (theorizing the concept of 
leadership via benevolent dictatorship) 
225  See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 65-76 (describing four-year edit war); 
LIH, supra note 11, at 122-32. 
226  See OSTROM, supra note 38, at 100-01 (emphasizing the importance of 
such fora). 
227  Well into the experiment, Wikipedia’s Jimmy Wales tried to split the edi-
torial into pro-war and anti-war versions to separate the warring camps, 
but by then it was too late. See Rainey, supra note 8. 
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The Los Angeles Times embraced Wikipedia’s technology 
and its commitment to distributed organization, but neglected 
its commitment to positive social norms. The wikitorial had 
neither hard security nor soft. There were two kinds of naiveté 
at work. First, there was the assumption that communities op-
erate without moderation, that broad participation by itself 
suffices. Second, there was the assumption that even if moder-
ation were needed, it would develop spontaneously. The Los 
Angeles Times neither moderated the wikitorial effectively nor 
created the conditions under which the community of partici-
pants could develop its own effective moderation. The wikitori-
al was cargo cult collaboration.228 
C. MetaFilter 
Not many online communities can say that they came to-
gether to save people from human trafficking, but MetaFilter 
can.229 Two young Russian women had come to the United 
States in May 2010 to work as lifeguards on Virginia Beach, 
but when they arrived, their contact instead told them to come 
to a bar on Long Island, the Lux Lounge, for some unspecified 
hostess work. Annoyed at their unreliable employer but enjoy-
ing their American adventure, they called Dan Reetz, an Amer-
ican they had befriended in Russia two years before. Reetz, 
who recognized the telltale signs of a sex-trafficking ring, was 
immediately alarmed. But he “was in his car on a highway in 
Wyoming with all his earthly belongings on his way to start a 
new job,” and couldn’t convince his friends of the danger they 
were in.230 Instead, he took the situation to MetaFilter. 
MetaFilter, founded in 1999 by programmer and blogger 
Matthew Haughey, calls itself a “community weblog.”231 It 
hosts discussions on user-submitted topics on a text-heavy 
                                                
228  Cf. Richard Feynman, Cargo Cult Science, in “SURELY YOU’RE JOKING, MR. 
FEYNMAN!”: ADVENTURES OF A CURIOUS CHARACTER 338, 342 (1997) (“[T]hey 
follow all the apparent precepts and forms . . . but they're missing some-
thing essential.”); see also Aaron Swartz, Making More Wikipedias, RAW 
THOUGHT (Sep. 14, 2006), http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/morewikipedias 
(“For the most part, people have simply assumed that Wikipedia is as 
simple as the name suggests: install some wiki software, say that it’s for 
writing an encyclopedia, and voila!—problem solved.”). 
229  See Stephen Thomas, The Internet’s First Family, HAZLITT (Oct. 31, 2014), 
http://penguinrandomhouse.ca/hazlitt/longreads/internets-first-family [ht 
tp://perma.cc/R8WT-AMSZ]. The story unfolded in real time on the Meta-
filter thread Help me help my friend in DC, at http://ask.metafilter.com/15 
4334/Help-me-help-my-friend-in-DC [http://perma.cc/6P36-WWPA], and 
sparked extensive discussion on a related thread, The kindness of 
strangers, http://metatalk.metafilter.com/19304/The-kindness-of-strangers 
[http://perma.cc/67LP-PZY2]. 
230  Thomas, supra note 229. 
231 METAFILTER, http://www.metafilter.com [http://perma.cc/4HSR-RDYS].  
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website with a laid-back feel and a simple interface.232 Each 
discussion—initiated when a logged-in user clicks on an unob-
trusive text link to create a new post—starts with a link to a 
page somewhere else on the web, along with a description to 
provide some context. Each new post then appears on the front 
page of the site, where the posts are sorted in reverse chrono-
logical order like a blog. Click on a post, and you go to a dedi-
cated page for that post, where you can read previous readers’ 
comments and add your own. Users who aren’t logged in can 
read posts and comments, but not add their own. The Meta-
filter community’s interests are diverse. As I write this, the 
first three links feature rare concert footage of the Velvet Un-
derground,233 an effort to stop public urination in India,234 and 
pre-WWII African-American science fiction.235 
Reetz posted to Ask MetaFilter, a sister site for questions to 
the community. His post went up at 5:09 PM, and increasingly 
concerned community members started exchanging infor-
mation about the bar, the girls’ situation, and human traffick-
ing resources. The next morning, another MetaFilter user, an 
unemployed nanny named Katherine Gutierrez, operating on 
almost no sleep, thought she might be able to divert the girls 
from the very bad idea of going to the Lux Lounge at midnight. 
She got their phone number from Reetz, and gave them a call. 
To avoid alarming them about her own intentions, she “pre-
sented herself as Just Another Fun-loving Young Gal In The 
Big City, Much Like Yourselves, and told the girls she’d gotten 
their numbers from a mutual friend and would be happy to 
hang out and show them around.”236 It worked. With the assis-
tance of some plainclothes police and many other MetaFilter 
users, she convinced the girls not to go to their meeting with 
the mysterious and menacing “George.” Instead, “they ulti-
mately stayed with her for a full month, during which time 
MeFites [MetaFilter users] in New York and around the coun-
try sent the out-of-work nanny money to help feed the girls, 
and helped also in other ways, such as taking the girls out on 
                                                
232  See generally Frequently Asked Questions, METATALK, http://faq.metafilter 
.com [http://perma.cc/N49A-URA6] [hereinafter MetaFilter FAQ]; META-
FILTER WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/Main_Page  [http://perma.cc/4AP9-
GPSV]. 
233  item, Velvet Underground / Exploding Plastic Inevitable Live in Boston 
1967, METAFILTER (May 26, 2014), http://www.metafilter.com/139386 
[http://perma.cc/WKR8-4UE3]. 
234  KokoRyu, “How can India stop people urinating in public?”, METAFILTER 
(May 26, 2014), http://www.metafilter.com/139385 [http://perma.cc/T57P-
BMF8]. 
235  Martin Wisse, Before Delany, before Butler, METAFILTER (May 26, 2014), 
http://www.metafilter.com/139384 [http://perma.cc/9DE6-NUZ3]. 
236  Thomas, supra note 229. 
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the town and putting them in touch with immigration lawyers 
and employment agencies.”237 
That’s MetaFilter in a nutshell (albeit its very best nut-
shell). Let’s dig in to how and why it works so well. In modera-
tion terms, ex post, centralized, human norm-setting domi-
nates, with editing and exclusion (and a tiny bit of pricing) in 
supporting roles. The central technique of moderation is sim-
ple: Haughey and a small group of paid moderators238 read 
posts and comments and take action against inappropriate 
ones.239 Some receive a gentle chiding, in the form of a com-
ment or email; others are deleted.240 Deleted posts are visible 
on the site (since people may have left comments on them or 
saved the URL), but they carry a short notice of why they were 
removed—for example, because there is already an active dis-
cussion of the same story or issue on the site in another post.241 
For particularly controversial or important actions, the moder-
ators or concerned users will create a discussion post on Meta-
Talk, another sister site for conversations about Metafilter it-
self.242 
The overriding goal is to maintain positive community 
norms. In its initial days, Haughey was the primary author of 
posts and was active in all discussion threads to set a good ex-
ample. The moderators’ policy of hiding inappropriate material 
quickly reinforces positive norms by making good behavior far 
more visible than bad. The explanations treat users who make 
mistakes as well-intentioned, and indicate that they are still 
welcomed members of the community. These discussions invite 
broad participation in articulating and shaping the communi-
ty’s norms. This is deletion in service of social norms as much 
as it is deletion for its own sake. The moderators enjoy sub-
stantial credibility on the site not just by virtue of their author-
                                                
237  Id. 
238  See Mods, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/Moderators [http://perma 
.cc/Y8CP-R3SC]. While this Article was in press, Haughey announced his 
retirement from MetaFilter to take up a day job, handing over the moder-
ation reins to the other members of the team. See mathowie [Matthew 
Haughey], Sixteen Years, METATALK (Mar. 4, 2015), http://metatalk.metafi 
lter.com/23626/Sixteen-Years [http://perma.cc/6B6R-LQKS]. 
239  See Matt Haughey, Real World Moderation: Lessons from 11 Years of 
Community, Presentation at SXSW Interactive (Mar. 12, 2011), available 
at https://vimeo.com/21043675 [https://perma.cc/J3GP-SGKH]. 
240  See Warnick, supra note 20, at 120-23. 
241  E.g., tofu_crouton [Sara Gore], We Must Not Call Him Sister, METAFILTER 
(July 28, 2014), http://www.metafilter.com/141401/We-Must-Not-Call-Him 
-Sister [http://perma.cc/JXV2-G4QN ] (“This post was deleted for the fol-
lowing reason: This kinda feels like a big fight in the making for no par-
ticular good reason. –cortex.”); see generally MetaFilter FAQ, supra note 
232; METAFILTER DELETED POSTS, http://mefideleted.blogspot.com [http:// 
perma.cc/UK6C-XKGE]. 
242  METATALK, http://metatalk.metafilter.com [http://perma.cc/CC7E-ZBRW]. 
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ity, but because “they’ve proven over and over again that they 
understand how communities work and deal with most issues 
patiently and courteously.”243 Humility is a key virtue. Even a 
recent visual makeover was an occasion for consultation rather 
than simply being imposed from the top down.244 
At the same time, the moderators and the community call 
out particularly noteworthy posts and comments for praise. 
Haughey maintains a small sideblog245 and a Twitter feed246 
that he uses to link to high-quality posts. There is a small, un-
obtrusive button on Metafilter to mark any post or comment as 
a “favorite”. The counts appear next to the post or comment 
and on the user’s profile page, functioning as a visible symbol 
of community praise. On Ask Metafilter, the question-asker can 
flag replies as “best answers,” again a visible symbol of 
praise.247 Users participate extensively in the explicit norm-
setting, too. They post comments rebuking and praising each 
other,248 take their debates to MetaTalk,249 and occasionally 
flag inappropriate posts and comments to bring them to the 
moderators’ attention.250 A lightweight message system, MeFi 
Mail, gives members a private back channel.251 
The other verbs of moderation appear almost entirely in 
secondary, supporting roles. There is a smattering of organiza-
tion: posts can be tagged and searched. In a form of ex ante de-
letion, users are limited to one post per twenty-four hours 
(though very few come anywhere near that pace). Commenting, 
however, is unlimited. There is $5 signup fee for new mem-
bers,252 which looks like pricing but functions more as a speed 
bump to exclude participants not really interested in the com-
                                                
243  See Warnick, supra note 20, at 101 (quoting MetaFilter user Rhaomi); see 
also Paul Lawton, Capital and Stratification Within Virtual Community: 
A Case Study of Metafilter.com 87-91 (2003) (unpublished B.A. disserta-
tion, University of Lethbridge), https://www.uleth.ca/dspace/bitstream/han 
dle/10133/267/MR17405.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AU8-E52N]. 
244  See mathowie [Matt Haughey], A new theme for MeFi: Modern, METATALK 
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/23445/A-new-theme-for-
MeFi-Modern [http://perma.cc/BQ5D-MRRA]. 
245  BEST OF METAFILTER, http://bestof.metafilter.com [http://perma.cc/WHM6-
264S]. 
246  @MetaFilter, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/metafilter [https://perma.cc/5X 
4V-G2DC]. 
247  ASK METAFILTER, http://ask.metafilter.com [http://perma.cc/2J27-EWKB]. 
248  See Leiser Silva, Lakshmi Goel & Elham Mousavidin, Exploring the Dy-
namics of Blog Communities: The Case of MetaFilter, 19 INFO. SYS. J. 55, 
67-73 (2008) (describing debates shaping norms of “good” and “bad” posts). 
249  See Lawton, supra note 243, at 70-85; Warnick, supra note 20, at 89-91 
(breaking down rhetorical functions of MetaTalk posts). 
250  See MetaFilter FAQ, supra note 232. 
251  See id. 
252  Create a New User, METAFILTER, http://www.metafilter.com/newuser.mefi 
[http://perma.cc/BQ5D-MRRA]. 
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munity.253 Those who misbehave have their accounts deactivat-
ed, no refunds offered. The real pricing consists of some light-
weight advertising.254 Most ads are hidden for members;255 the 
site sustains itself primarily on the revenue from outsiders who 
come across particular pages on web searches.256 
MetaFilter’s treatment of identity is carefully modulated. It 
is easy to browse a user’s history of posts and comments, and 
some users choose to decorate their profiles with detailed in-
formation about themselves,257 but the default is persistent 
pseudonymity.258 Members are known primarily by their 
usernames, such that dedicated discussants can build up ex-
tensive reputations on MetaFilter without revealing their real-
life identities. In one part of the site, however, these rules are 
suspended: members can post anonymous questions on Ask-
MetaFilter—just the thing for seeking advice on an abusive re-
lationship or a difficult workplace issue.259 Because of the de-
creased norm-based constraints on abusive questions, anony-
mous questions go through ex ante human moderator review 
                                                
253  See Hannah Pileggi, Brianna Morrison & Amy Bruckman, Deliberate Bar-
riers to User Participation on MetaFilter (Georgia Institute of Technology 
School of Interactive Computing, Technical Report No. GT-IC-14-01 2014), 
https://smartech.gatech.edu/handle/1853/50776 [https://perma.cc/E55N-C 
BUR]. 




256  MetaFilter’s biggest threat currently comes not from internal community 
dynamics but from a shift in the online advertising ecosystem. In Novem-
ber 2012, Google changed its ranking algorithms in a way that appears to 
have significantly demoted MetaFilter, instantly slashing the site’s traffic 
from non-members and with it, the site’s advertising revenue. See Matt 
Haughey, On the Future of MetaFilter, MEDIUM (May 21, 2014), 
https://medium.com/technology-musings/on-the-future-of-metafilter-941d1 
5ec96f0 [https://perma.cc/G28F-8USR]. Haughey was forced to lay off 
three members of the already small moderation staff as a result. See 
mathowie [Matt Haughey], The State of MetaFilter, METATALK (May 19, 
2014), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/23245/State-of-MetaFilter [http://per 
ma.cc/JA6V-R5YH]. The exact reason for the decline in MetaFitler’s 
Google rankings remains unclear. The change seems to have been unin-
tentional on Google’s part, but Google has not acted decisively to fix it. See 
Danny Sullivan, On MetaFilter Being Penalized By Google: An Explainer, 
SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 22, 2014), http://searchengineland.com/metafil 
ter-penalized-google-192168 [http://perma.cc/2RNQ-WPJ9]. 
257  See Noor Ali-Hasan, MetaFilter: Analysis of a Community Weblog (2005), 
http://www.nooratwork.com/pdf/ali-hasan_metafilter.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/7SRF-PHDE]. 
258  See MetaFilter FAQ, supra note 232. 
259  Id.; akomom, confused about how to successfully ask anonymously, ASK 
METAFILTER (Mar. 27, 2012), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/21588/confuse 
d-about-how-to-successfully-ask-anonymously [http://perma.cc/5YJ6-CZZ2]. 
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rather than ex post.260 “Anonymous questions are for basic pri-
vacy, not for hiding from Interpol.”261 
Overall, MetaFilter is a moderation success story. In 2013, 
it had about 40,000 active users, who created about 11,000 
posts and 600,000 comments.262 The flow of posts is consistent-
ly interesting but not overwhelming. Although the site is occa-
sionally challenged by vandals or infiltrated by marketers, it is 
for the most part an authentic conversation among engaged 
participants. Users have been known to spend weeks crafting 
massive posts that do deep dives on a topic, collecting hundreds 
of related links into a perfectly curated collection.263 In 2001, 
the MetaFilter community collaboratively exposed an Internet 
hoax—a fictional teenager with equally fictional terminal leu-
kemia.264 The site has been self-sustaining for years, and there 
are strong feelings of belonging and community among active 
posters. There are face-to-face meet-ups in major (and minor) 
cities,265 a rich vocabulary of references and in-jokes,266 a holi-
day gift exchange called Secret Quonsar,267 and at least one 
                                                
260  See MetaFilter FAQ, supra note 232. 
261  Id. 
262  See MetaFilter Stats 2013, MEFI LABS, http://labs.metafilter.com/mefi-stat 
s-2013 [http://perma.cc/GG7T-4JYB]. 
263  For a particularly outstanding example, see Miko, Alice’s Restaurant, 
METAFILTER (Nov. 25, 2010), http://www.metafilter.com/97904/Alices-Rest 
aurant [http://perma.cc/5FKC-EZ6X], a post celebrating the Arlo Guthrie 
song “Alice’s Restaurant” by extensively hyperlinking the song’s lyrics; see 
also What Is a Good Post, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/What_Is_A 
_Good_Post [http://perma.cc/D5WB-QGDN]; Posting Guidelines, META-
FILTER, http://www.metafilter.com/guidelines.mefi [http://perma.cc/H52N-
T8S5]. 
264  See acidrabbit, Is it possible that Kaycee did not exist?, METAFILTER (May 
19, 2001), http://www.metafilter.com/7819/Is-it-possible-that-Kaycee-did-
not-exist [http://perma.cc/A74A-J9SM]; Katie Hafner, A Beautiful Life, an 
Early Death, a Fraud Exposed, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2001, http://www.nyti 
mes.com/2001/05/31/technology/a-beautiful-life-an-early-death-a-fraud-
exposed.html [http://perma.cc/K3MV-QMJS]. 
265  Indeed, MetaFilter has an entire subsite devoted to meetups. MEFIIRL, 
http://irl.metafilter.com [http://perma.cc/BS3W-ENYL]; see also Lauren F. 
Sessions, How Offline Gatherings Affect Online Communities, 13 INFO., 
COMM., & SOC. 375-95 (2010) (analyzing the effect of meetups on the 
MetaFilter community). 
266  See In Jokes, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/In_Jokes [http://perma 
.cc/9KBM-C8K8]. For example, “Pepsi Blue” is “a sort of catch-all cat-call 
for something that is a possible shill posting on MetaFilter—that is, an ad 
or product endorsement for reasons other than just overall consumer joy.” 
See Pepsi Blue, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/Pepsi_Blue [http://per 
ma.cc/F7NT-QWNM]. More seriously, it is common to leave comments 
consisting solely of a period, as a moment of silent mourning. See The Pe-
riod, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/The_Period [http://perma.cc/7LY 
K-H9BW]. 
267  See Secret Quonsar, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/Secret_Quonsar 
[http://perma.cc/U4TV-2KQF]. Quonsar was the username of a prolific, if 
problematic, MetaFilter user. See Lawton, supra note 243, at 100. 
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marriage of users who met through MetaFilter.268 It is a strik-
ingly different kind of community than Wikipedia with strik-
ingly different moderation, but it also works. 
D. Reddit 
If the Portland-based MetaFilter is artisanal small-batch 
news, then the San Francisco-based Reddit is crowd-sourced 
post-industrial news.269 Instead of MetaFilter’s loving, central-
ized, ex post, human moderation with a strong emphasis on 
norm-setting, Reddit depends on finely machined, distributed, 
ex post, algorithmic moderation with a strong emphasis on an-
notation and filtering.270 The contrast between them shows 
both the diversity of moderation and some of its recurring chal-
lenges. 
Reddit’s users moderate primarily by voting on content.271 
Each post and each comment are accompanied by two arrows. 
Click the up arrow, and the item gains an “upvote”; click the 
down arrow, and the item gains a “downvote.” Reddit uses the 
upvotes and downvotes to determine the order in which posts 
and comments are displayed.272 Well-liked posts bubble to the 
top and are seen by more users; disliked ones are rapidly driv-
en down to invisibility. This is ex post, distributed, human an-
notation, used as an input to centralize automatic filtration. 
The algorithm that weights upvotes and downvotes has been 
carefully tuned both to maintain a fresh flow of new content 
                                                
268  See MrMoonPie, the wedding of NortonDC and onlyconnect, who met at a 
meetup, METATALK (Sept. 24, 2005), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/10231 
[http://perma.cc/8EZL-C7EP]. 
269  REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com [http://perma.cc/7QL4-JCJK]. 
270  See generally Tom Lamont, Reddit: How to Win the Internet, THE GUARDI-
AN, Feb. 7, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/07/red 
dit-how-to-win-the-internet [http://perma.cc/M2MN-JYZV]. 
271  See Frequently Asked Questions, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/wiki/faq 
[http://perma.cc/4UDT-7JV8] [hereinafter Reddit FAQ]. 
272 Id.  This core idea of upvotes and downvotes has been in widespread use 
for years. Slashdot, a social news site, pioneered the extensive reliance on 
algorithms to sort comments. See generally Lampe, supra note 84. Slash-
dot’s system grew particularly baroque over time: it developed a system of 
“meta-moderation,” in which users would examine each others’ modera-
tion decisions and then vote on whether those decisions were correct or in-
correct. Users whose decisions were frequently voted correct would receive 
“karma” points, which in turn allowed them to moderate and meta-
moderate more frequently. Id. For further discussion of karma systems, 
see FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 75-82. Reddit passes posts them-
selves through the voting algorithm, not just comments. Thus, unlike on 
Slashdot or MetaFilter, where every post has been vetted or even edited 
by moderators affiliated with the site, the choice of which Reddit posts are 
prominent is in the hands of the voting algorithm. This is not unique to 
Reddit—the social news site Digg.com had it first—but it is characteristic 
of Reddit. 
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and to keep early votes from disproportionately influencing a 
post’s or comment's fate.273 
Reddit also relies on a layer of distributed organization. 
Any user can create a “subreddit” devoted to discussion on a 
particular topic.274 Within the subreddit, the usual upvote and 
downvote mechanics apply, but moderators also enjoy substan-
tial editorial discretion: they can remove “objectionable or off 
topic” comments and ban abusive users from the subreddit.275 
This, in effect, splits Reddit into a large number of smaller 
communities, each combining automated filtration with human 
deletion.276 It also makes exiting an appealing option within 
Reddit: users who dislike a subreddit can easily avoid it.277 
There are a few other techniques in use on Reddit, but they 
occupy subsidiary roles. The site has a custom advertising plat-
form that allows either generic site-wide advertising or adver-
tising targeted at the users of particular subreddits.278 It also 
                                                
273  For explanations of the algorithmic details, see Michael Billard, Reddit’s 
Empire No Longer Founded on a Flawed Algorithm, OUT OF SCOPE, Feb. 
16, 2014, http://www.outofscope.com/reddits-empire-no-longer-founded-on-
a-flawed-algorithm [http://perma.cc/2SNA-LYN3]; Randall Munroe, Red-
dit’s New Comment Sorting System, REDDIT BLOG (Oct. 15, 2009), 
http://www.redditblog.com/2009/10/reddits-new-comment-sorting-system 
.html [http://perma.cc/2MZR-KYWX]; Jonathan Rochkind, Reddit’s Actu-
al? (Or a Variation?) Story Ranking Algorithm Explained (Significant Ty-
pos in Previously Published Version (Or Not)), BIBLIOGRAPHIC WILDERNESS 
(May 8, 2012), http://bibwild.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/reddit-story-rank 
ing-algorithm [http://perma.cc/8MFX-CHFS]; and Amir Salihefendic, How 
Reddit Ranking Algorithms Work, HACKING AND GONZO (Nov. 23, 2010), 
http://amix.dk/blog/post/19588 [http://perma.cc/ECF5-HTAS]. 
274  See Reddit FAQ, supra note 271. 
275  Id. 
276  See Moderation, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/wiki/moderation [http://pe 
rma.cc/9R3Q-74ND]. Users, in turn, can combine up to 100 subreddits into 
a personal “front page” that brings together posts from all of the subred-
dits they follow—another form of filtration. See Reddit FAQ, supra note 
271. Users who are not logged in see a default front page combining posts 
from a curated list of fifty subreddits. See cupcake1713 [Alex Angel], 
What’s That, Lassie? The Old Defaults Fell Down a Well?, REDDIT BLOG 
(May 7, 2014), http://www.redditblog.com/2014/05/whats-that-lassie-old-
defaults-fell.html [http://perma.cc/X87N-ETZU]. There are also quotas on 
the number of front-page posts from each subreddit to prevent the largest 
and most popular subreddits from dominating the front page. See Todd W. 
Schneider, The Reddit Front Page Is Not a Meritocracy, TODD W. SCHNEI-
DER (Nov. 6, 2014), http://toddwschneider.com/posts/the-reddit-front-page-
is-not-a-meritocracy [http://perma.cc/8LSB-47FS]. 
277  See Adrian Chen, Reddit CEO Speaks Out On Violentacrez In Leaked 
Memo: 'We Stand for Free Speech', GAWKER, Oct. 16, 2012, http://gawker 
.com/5952349/reddit-ceo-speaks-out-on-violentacrez-in-leaked-memo-we-
stand-for-free-speech [http://perma.cc/XH2A-KTA9]. 
278  See Advertise, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/advertising [http://perma.cc/ 
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implements pricing through a “Gold” membership tier for $3.99 
per month that hides ads and gives users a few more sophisti-
cated filtration choices.279 The site uses a spam filter to delete 
automated posts, and it fights hard against voting manipula-
tion (such as using multiple accounts to upvote a post).280 User 
accounts are banned for abuse (i.e., excluded),281 and if a web-
site is caught repeatedly trying to manipulate its way onto 
Reddit, the entire domain may be banned: all links to it are de-
leted ex ante on sight.282 Norm-building meetups take place, 
but given the sheer size of the Reddit community, they reach 
only a small portion of the user population.283 
In many ways, Reddit is transparent. Its source code, for 
example, is made publicly available.284 But there is a strong 
undercurrent of opacity. A few operational details are shrouded 
in secrecy to protect the voting system from being gamed. Thus, 
actual upvote and downvote totals are “fuzzed” so that users 
cannot tell exactly which tactics are successfully getting past 
the vote-cheating detectors.285 The site sometimes shadowbans 
spammers, letting them think their accounts are active and 
working, while quietly deleting their posts and ignoring their 
votes.286 Individual subreddit moderators frequently push their 
personal political agendas by using their power to secretly de-
lete content. Moderators have even been known to take bribes 
in exchange for promoting particular content.287 
Something about the combination works.288 After a few 
years of steady growth following its 2005 founding, Reddit took 
                                                
279  See Gold, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/gold/about [http://perma.cc/Z9H4 
-AKY5]. 
280  See Reddit FAQ, supra note 271. 
281  See id. 
282  See, e.g., Peter Bright, Year-Long E-Sports Site Ban Shows the Dangers of 
Gaming Reddit, ARS TECHNICA, July 3, 2014, http://arstechnica.com/gam 
ing/2014/07/year-long-e-sports-site-ban-shows-the-dangers-of-gaming-red 
dit [http://perma.cc/F933-VKYA]. 
283  See, e.g., Matthew Shaer, Reddit in the Flesh, N.Y. MAG., July 8, 2012, 
http://nymag.com/news/features/reddit-2012-7 [http://perma.cc/N9TT-ZB2 
M]. 
284  See Reddit—Reddit, GITHUB, https://github.com/reddit/reddit [https://perm 
a.cc/Z4D7-2LHD]. 
285  See Reddit FAQ, supra note 271. 
286  See User Specific FAQs, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/help/wiki/faq 
[http://perma.cc/M8KG-72LG]. See also cojoco, An Unofficial Guide on 
How to Avoid Being Shadowbanned, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/Sha 
dowBan/comments/1x92jy/an_unofficial_guide_on_how_to_avoid_being 
[http://perma.cc/SF3M-2YX5]. 
287  See, e.g., David Auerbach, Does Reddit Have a Transparency Problem?, 
SLATE, Oct. 9, 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology 
/2014/10/reddit_scandals_does_the_site_have_a_transparency_problem.ht
ml [http://perma.cc/EHL8-2KSN]. 
288 For an example of Reddit at its best, see Kevin Morris, The Greatest Story 
Reddit Ever Told, THE KERNEL, Nov. 2, 2014, http://kernelmag.dailydot 
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off like a rocket in the early 2010s.289 Where MetaFilter is a 
water fountain, Reddit is a firehose. In 2013, Reddit had over 2 
million users who made 41 million posts, 400 million com-
ments, and 6.7 billion votes.290 Reddit’s “Ask Me Anything” 
crowd-sourced interviews have featured everyone from Presi-
dent Obama291 to Jerry Seinfeld,292 and one literally epic Reddit 
thread—who would win in a fight between a U.S. Marine Ex-
peditionary Unit and the Roman Empire?—was optioned by 
Warner Brothers.293 
The contrast between MetaFilter and Reddit is striking. 
Even though they have broadly similar missions—threaded 
discussions about things from around the web—the two sites 
have succeeded as communities for very different reasons. 
Metafilter relies on its core team of administrators to set con-
sistent rules and norms across the site. Reddit, on the other 
hand, is built to scale. Its site-wide administrators tweak the 
algorithms occasionally but avoid almost all individual modera-
tion decisions. All of those decisions are delegated either to the 
ranking algorithms or to the moderators of subreddits. Meta-
Filter works because almost all of its users want it to work, be-
cause its moderators are personally attuned to its users’ inter-
ests, and because it offers a single coherent community. Reddit 
works because many of its users want it to work, because its 
algorithms are well-tuned to reflect its users’ overall prefer-
ences, and because its subreddits are compartmentalized from 
each others’ failures. 
Every community has to deal with abuse. Reddit’s respons-
es show both the power and the limits of its moderation tech-
                                                                                                         
.com/issue-sections/headline-story/10727/dante-orpilla-youngluck-reddit 
gifts/ [http://perma.cc/MH7A-KHAQ]. 




290  See hueypriest [Erik Martin], Top Posts of 2013, Stats, and Snoo Year's 
Resolutions, REDDIT BLOG (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.redditblog.com/2013 
/12/top-posts-of-2013-stats-and-snoo-years.html [http://perma.cc/Q5CX-GT 
QH]. 
291  See I am Barack Obama, President of the United States—AMA, REDDIT, 
http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/z1c9z/i_am_barack_obama_presi
dent_of_the_united_states [http://perma.cc/4FEF-6B8P]. 
292  See Jerry Seinfeld here. I will give you an answer., REDDIT, http://www.red 
dit.com/r/IAmA/comments/1ujvrg/jerry_seinfeld_here_i_will_give_you_an_
answer [http://perma.cc/CS2E-Y7XM]; see generally Ryan Holiday, Inside 
the Reddit AMA: The Interview Revolution That Has Everyone Talking, 
FORBES, May 1, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanholiday/2012/05/01 
/inside-the-reddit-ama-the-interview-revolution-that-has-everyone-talking 
[http://perma.cc/EVE4-V8CU]. 
293  See Jason Fagone, How One Response to a Reddit Query Became a Big-
Budget Flick, WIRED, Mar. 20, 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/03/ff_red 
dit/all [http://perma.cc/EVE4-V8CU]. 
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niques. On the one hand, the combination of decentralization 
and filtering is often effective in enabling users to avoid con-
tent they dislike. While sometimes users choose to stay and ar-
gue over the direction of a subreddit, on the whole, exit domi-
nates over voice.294 Reddit invites dissatisfied users to “consider 
making a new subreddit and shaping it the way you'd like ra-
ther than performing a sit-in and/or witch hunt.”295  
Reddit therefore adopts a strongly libertarian official atti-
tude toward free speech.296 The administrators will not inter-
vene to remove content. Users who dislike something are ex-
pected to avoid it rather than seek to have it removed. The only 
exception is when there is a legal requirement to remove con-
tent, and even then, the administrators make a show of acting 
only when compelled to.297 Relatedly, Reddit users are encour-
aged to protect their privacy with pseudonymity. “It is thought 
bad form on Reddit to reveal your real name,”298 and there is a 
strong norm against “doxxing”—revealing personal information 
about members without their consent.299 
But if these features—strong subreddit communities, toler-
ance of differing views, and pseudonymous speech—make Red-
dit effective at defusing internal conflicts and catalyzing inter-
nal cooperation, they can make it downright dangerous to out-
siders. Reddit is passionate about creating strong communities 
but completely indifferent as to whether those communities col-
laborate for good or for ill. After the Aurora shooting, Reddit 
was a leading source for sorting through the chaos of conflict-
                                                
294  See Grimmelmann, Anarchy, supra note 25 (describing a controversy 
within /r/politics subreddit after moderators banned links from the left-
leaning Mother Jones). 
295  Id. 
296  See, e.g., yishan [Yishan Wong], Fundraising for Reddit, REDDIT BLOG 
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.redditblog.com/2014/09/fundraising-for-reddit 
.html [http://perma.cc/FA9E-B2NS] (“We believe in free speech, self-
governing communities, and the power of voting.”); Morris, supra note 288 
(“The site’s founders . . . instilled an institutional devotion to ideals of free 
speech, turning Reddit into an online petri dish for experiments in 
stretching the First Amendment to its breaking point.”). 
297  This ethos made Reddit a crucial nexus in the online protests that halted 
the copyright-filtering bills SOPA and PIPA in 2012. Reddit was the first 
major site to announce a blackout for the day of protest. See Stopped they 
must be; on this all depends, REDDIT BLOG (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.red 
ditblog.com/2012/01/stopped-they-must-be-on-this-all.html [http://perma 
.cc/Z9FD-NLR7]; see also Tom Cheredar, Reddit Goes Black Jan. 18 to 
Protest SOPA & PIPA—Who else will join?, VENTUREBEAT, Jan. 10, 2012, 
http://venturebeat.com/2012/01/10/reddit-blackout-sopa-pipa [http://perma 
.cc/2JT6-3ZFH]. 
298  Lamont, supra note 270. 
299  See C. S.-W., What Doxxing Is, and Why It Matters, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 
10, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/eco 
nomist-explains-9 [http://perma.cc/T9X3-XBJJ]. 
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ing reports.300 But after the Boston Marathon bombing, an ad 
hoc community of Reddit users misidentified a missing Brown 
undergraduate, Sunil Tripathi, as one of the bombers, touching 
off a media firestorm and causing his family great distress.301 
In some cases, entire subreddits are devoted to illegal and 
immoral purposes. Take /r/jailbait, which featured “sexually 
suggestive pictures of teenage girls, most of whom appear[ed] 
to be under the age of 18.”302 After CNN’s Anderson Cooper ran 
an expose on /r/jailbait in 2011, its traffic spiked. Eventually 
Reddit staff shut it down amid allegations that users were 
trading actual child pornography.303 A year later, the creator of 
/r/jailbait, a user with the name violentacrez, became involved 
in a similar controversy over /r/creepshots, “where users posted 
covert photos they had taken of women in public . . . for a vo-
yeuristic sexual thrill.”304 This time, journalist Adrian Chen 
identified the person behind the violentacrez account, a pro-
grammer from Texas named Michael Brutsch.305 The initial re-
sponse from many subreddit moderators was defensive: they 
banned links to Gawker on the grounds that the story violated 
violentacrez’s privacy.306 Indeed, for a while, Reddit itself 
banned links to Gawker because of the unmasking.307 In the 
end, the bad publicity was too much to withstand. Brutsch was 
fired from his job at a financial services company, Gawker was 
unbanned, and /r/creepshots was deleted.308 But the story 
                                                
300  See Jay Caspian Kang, Should Reddit Be Blamed for the Spreading of a 
Smear?, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/m 
agazine/should-reddit-be-blamed-for-the-spreading-of-a-smear.html [http: 
//perma.cc/RU9Y-SJZS]. 
301  Id. 
302  See Kevin Morris, Anderson Cooper Addresses Reddit’s Teen Pics Section, 
THE DAILY DOT, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.dailydot.com/news/anderson-
cooper-jailbait-reddit [http://perma.cc/V59S-X4BL]. 
303  See Kevin Morris, Reddit Shuts Down Teen Pics Section, THE DAILY DOT, 
Oct. 11, 2011, http://www.dailydot.com/society/reddit-r-jailbait-shutdown-
controversy [http://perma.cc/DY2M-XAET]. 
304  Adrian Chen, Unmasking Reddit's Violentacrez, The Biggest Troll on the 
Web, GAWKER, Oct. 12, 2012, http://gawker.com/5950981/unmasking-reddi 
ts-violentacrez-the-biggest-troll-on-the-web [http://perma.cc/Z457-87XA]. 
305  Id. 
306  See Kevin Morris, Clearing up Rumors and Hearsay as the Internet Eager-
ly Awaits the Gawker Reddit Story, THE DAILY DOT, Oct. 12, 2012, http:// 
www.dailydot.com/news/reddit-adrian-chen-violentacrez-gawker-rumors 
[http://perma.cc/2JUL-NAQL]. 
307  See Katie Notopoulos, Leaked Reddit Chat Logs Reveal Moderators’ Re-
al Concern, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Oct. 13, 2012), http://www.buzzfeed.com/kati 
enotopoulos/leaked-chat-logs-between-reddit-moderators-and-sta [http:// 
perma.cc/M5VQ-UXLY]. 
308  See Fernando Alfonso III, Reddit’s Most Notorious Troll Loses Job After 
Gawker Profile, THE DAILY DOT, Oct. 15, 2012, http://www.dailydot.com/ne 
ws/violentacrez-reddit-troll-fired-gawker-profile [http://perma.cc/J5KW-W 
WZG]. But see Fernando Alfonso III, Creepshots Never Went Away—We 
Just Stopped Talking About Them, THE DAILY DOT, Feb. 7, 2014, http:// 
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shows how toxic Reddit’s combination of tolerance and pseudo-
nymity can be. 
More recently, but just as alarmingly, Reddit played a 
prominent role in the 2014 release of nude photographs of ce-
lebrities such as Jennifer Lawrence and Kirsten Dunst. The 
photos were initially stolen by a loose-knit coalition of hackers 
who scour the Internet looking for enough personal information 
to gain access to the victims’ online accounts.309 The photos 
might have stayed hidden within the hackers’ semi-private 
networks had it not been for the Reddit user johnsmcjohn, who 
created the /r/TheFappening subreddit to share them.310 Within 
a day, the subreddit had tens of thousands of members.311 Red-
dit’s official response was a masterpiece of muddled messaging. 
CEO Yishan Wong wrote a blog post, portentously titled “Every 
Man Is Responsible For His Own Soul,” that doubled down on 
Reddit’s commitment to free speech, explaining “why we will 
not ban questionable subreddits, of which /r/TheFappening is 
one of them.”312 Almost simultaneously, and supposedly by 
complete coincidence, Reddit banned /r/TheFappening.313 The 
stated reason for the ban was not that trading links to stolen 
nude photographs was wrong, or that trading links to stolen 
nude photographs was illegal, but that the burden of respond-
ing to DMCA takedown requests had become unsustainable in 
light of users’ continual attempts to repost the photographs af-
ter each takedown.314 Wong’s explanation of Reddit’s sense of 
itself is telling, and deserves to be quoted at length: 
                                                                                                         
www.dailydot.com/lifestyle/reddit-creepshots-candidfashionpolice-photos 
[http://perma.cc/4B8U-CJEA]. 
309  See Nik Cubrilovic, Notes on the Celebrity Data Theft, NEW WEB ORDER 
(Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.nikcub.com/posts/notes-on-the-celebrity-data-
theft [https://perma.cc/5NMQ-MJH5]. 
310  See Caitlin Dewey, Meet the Unashamed 33-Year-Old Who Brought the 
Stolen Celebrity Nudes to the Masses, WASH. POST., Sept. 5, 2014, http://w 
ww.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/09/05/meet-the-unas 
hamed-33-year-old-who-brought-the-stolen-celebrity-nudes-to-the-masses 
[http://perma.cc/PK3J-6FA2]. “‘Fap’ is an onomatopoeic Internet slang 
term for the act of masturbation.” Fap, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyou 
rmeme.com/memes/fap [http://perma.cc/QJ6Z-G6E6]. 
311  See Rob Price, Reddit's Privacy Rules Fail as Celebrity Nudes Spread Like 
Wildfire, THE DAILY DOT, Sept. 1, 2014, http://www.dailydot.com/business 
/reddit-jennifer-lawrence-kate-upton-nude-photos-leak-privacy-dox-ban 
[http://perma.cc/4XFQ-NTFY]. 
312  See yishan [Yishan Wong], Every Man Is Responsible For His Own Soul, 
REDDIT BLOG (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.redditblog.com/2014/09/every-ma 
n-is-responsible-for-his-own.html [http://perma.cc/9HYP-T2N7]. 
313  Id. 
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The reason is because we consider ourselves 
not just a company running a website where one 
can post links and discuss them, but the govern-
ment of a new type of community. The role and 
responsibility of a government differs from that 
of a private corporation, in that it exercises re-
straint in the usage of its powers.  
. . .  
The philosophy behind this stems from the 
idea that each individual is responsible for his or 
her moral actions.  
We uphold the ideal of free speech on reddit 
as much as possible not because we are legally 
bound to, but because we believe that you—the 
user—has the right to choose between right and 
wrong, good and evil, and that it is your respon-
sibility to do so. When you know something is 
right, you should choose to do it. But as much as 
possible, we will not force you to do it.315 
If Reddit is like a nation, it has all of the best and worst 
features of real ones. On the one hand, it is thriving and plural-
istic, capable both of fostering diverse communities and binding 
them together in a common collective project. On the other, it 
turns a blind eye to terrorist training camps on its soil.316 Fili-
busters regularly set forth from Reddit in search of adventure 
and infamy as they destabilize the rest of the Internet. 
IV. Lessons for Law 
The moderation techniques presented here may seem to de-
fy easy generalization. But it is possible to highlight a few 
things that tie them together: 
• Moderation is complex. The Reddit algorithm 
has been finely tuned over years. So has Matt 
Haughey’s situational sense of how to respond to 
intemperate comments. Wikipedia’s fractious 
norms have been the subject of multiple books. 
The grammar of moderation in Parts II and III is 
complicated because moderation itself is compli-
cated. 
• Moderation is diverse. Reddit, MetaFilter, 
Google News, and The New York Times solve the 
same problem in four radically different ways. 
                                                
315  yishan, supra note 312 (emphasis in original). 
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Wikipedia alone uses dozens of different modera-
tion techniques. There is no one formula for suc-
cess. Moderation contains multitudes. 
• Moderation is necessary. It may be possible 
for an online community to go without central-
ized moderation, or without ex ante moderation, 
or without human moderation, or without exclu-
sion, or without explicit pricing, or without open-
ing any particular drawer in the moderation tool 
chest. But it cannot go without moderation en-
tirely, as the Los Angeles Times discovered. If a 
successful community appears to be unmoderat-
ed, look more closely, until its implicit technical 
constraints or shared norms come into focus. 
• Moderation is messy. Moderation depends on 
a site’s technological affordances: they shape how 
members can communicate and interact. But a 
community’s fate is not determined by its tech-
nology. Redditors’ passion does not come from 
the voting algorithm; not all wikis are Wikipedia. 
Moderation depends just as much on social 
norms, and thus it is always emergent, contin-
gent, and contestable. 
• Moderation is both top-down and bottom-up. 
Moderation takes place at the interface between 
infrastructure and interaction. Both owners and 
authors can influence a community’s course, but 
neither can control it. MetaFilter would not exist 
without Matt Haughey’s long stewardship. But if 
he were to say, “jump!” the community would 
mostly give him side-eye. A well-moderated 
community is like a wildflower garden. A good 
moderator can create the conditions for life, but 
not life itself. 
To see how these insights play out in a regulatory context, 
consider the two principal legal regimes that govern online 
communities: § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which 
provides broad immunity for interactive computer services,317 
and § 512 of the Copyright Act, which provides a copyright safe 
harbor.318 Both of them seek to give communities substantial 
breathing room to set their own moderation policies, but they 
adopt very different attitudes and expectations towards moder-
ators. 
                                                
317  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
318  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
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A. Communications Decency Act § 230 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) fa-
mously immunizes any “provider or user of an interactive com-
puter service” from being treated as “the publisher or speaker” 
of user-generated content.319 At the same time, it provides 
equally broad immunity for “any action voluntarily taken in 
good faith to restrict access to” objectionable material.320 This is 
a double-pronged protection for moderation: it gives moderators 
immunity both for the content they moderate and the content 
they miss. The overall effect, despite the “good faith” qualifier 
in the second prong, is that moderators have blanket immuni-
ty: no moderation decision can lead to liability under defama-
tion law,321 securities law,322 civil rights law,323 consumer-
protection law,324 or almost-anything law. A wide variety of 
moderation techniques are protected, including paying au-
thors,325 selective deletion,326 and extensive organization.327 
The underlying policy is to encourage moderation by taking 
away the threat of liability for mismoderation.328 A pre-CDA 
decision held that the pre-Web service Prodigy could be held 
liable for a defamatory post by a user. The court reasoned that 
Prodigy was “making decisions as to content” and was therefore 
a publisher of the defamatory material.329 A similar service, 
CompuServe, had escaped liability because it exercised “no 
more editorial control . . . than does a public library, book store, 
or newsstand.”330 Taken together, the decisions created a per-
verse disincentive to moderate. 
The CDA’s solution thus embodies three assumptions about 
moderation. First, it views moderation as desirable—better to 
                                                
319  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). My discussion focuses on § 230(c)(1), which 
gives providers immunity when they fail to remove objectionable content. 
For a useful discussion of § 230(c)(2), which gives providers immunity 
when they act in good faith to remove objectionable content, see Eric 
Goldman, Online User Account Termination and 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), 2 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 659 (2012) (describing and defending this immunity as 
applied to exclusion). 
320  Id. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
321  E.g., Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
322  E.g., Universal Commc’n Systems v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 
2007). 
323  E.g., Fair  Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
324  E.g., Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
325  E.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
326  E.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). 
327  E.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 
328 Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
329  Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *4 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
330  Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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have Prodigies and not just CompuServes. Second, it treats 
moderation as fallible. Even if Prodigy can find and remove 
some offensive posts, it is all but certain to miss others. Third, 
it believes that looking over moderators’ shoulders is ill ad-
vised. Rather than trying to enforce a reasonable-moderator 
standard of conduct, § 230 says that any moderation, even do-
nothing moderation, is good enough. 
In light of the discussion above, the first two assumptions 
are eminently justified: moderation is necessary, and modera-
tion is messy. These are close to universal laws of moderation. 
A regulatory scheme that does not take them into account 
verges on madness. But the third assumption is more contesta-
ble. On the one hand, moderation’s complexity and diversity 
counsel regulatory caution. A judicially enforced standard of 
conduct risks flattening out distinctions among communities 
and moderators, thereby stomping on valuable experiments in 
self-governance.331 On the other hand, moderators really do 
have some power. Some gardeners grow lilies; others grow 
nightshade.  
Take the late and little-lamented Is Anyone Up, a website 
dedicated to revenge porn.332 Like/r/jailbait and 
/r/TheFappening, it was a toxic community built on criminal 
conduct. Moderation made it better for participants and worse 
for the rest of the world. This is not a kind of collaboration soci-
ety should encourage. Is Anyone Up’s operator, Hunter Moore, 
pleaded guilty to federal hacking and identity theft charges for 
paying a co-conspirator to steal nude photos and post them to 
Is Anyone Up.333 But should his liability turn on his personal 
involvement? The site itself was illegitimate, the privacy 
equivalent of a service “good for nothing else but infringe-
ment.”334 Moore moderated it with malice aforethought. There 
is a pragmatic question of whether it is feasible for the judicial 
system to distinguish the Is Anyone Ups of the world from the 
Prodigies, but the question is really one about how much we 
wish to subject moderation to judicial review.335 It seems un-
                                                
331  See H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facil-
itating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369 
(2008). 
332  See Camille Dodero, Hunter Moore Makes a Living Screwing You, VILLAGE 
VOICE, Apr. 4, 2012, http://www.villagevoice.com/2012-04-04/news/revenge 
-porn-hunter-moore-is-anyone-up [http://perma.cc/QXD5-CXAL]. 
333  See Plea Agreement for Defendant Hunter Moore, U.S. v. Moore, No. 2:13-
cr-00917-DMG (Feb. 18, 2015), available at http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/revenge-porn-Hunter-Moore-plea-agreement.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ESP6-3QFS]. 
334  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 
(2005). 
335  Cf. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Virtual(ly) Law: The Emergence of Law in 
LambdaMOO, 2 J. COMP.-MEDIATED COMM. (June 1996). 
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likely that § 230’s across-the-board immunity is ideal. Even if 
in many cases judges are poorly situated to second-guess mod-
eration decisions, they should not be writing blank checks to 
moderators like Hunter Moore, violentacrez, and johnsmc-
john.336 Moderation to please a community’s insiders is not the 
same as moderation to protect outsiders, and we need not treat 
them the same. 
Another way in which § 230 currently exhibits too much 
deference to bad-faith moderation is illustrated by Jones v. 
Dirty World.337 The Dirty is a website that features user-
provided “Dirty Army intel, opinions, gossip, satire, and celeb-
rities.” It is edited by Nik Lamas-Richie.338 A user submitted 
photographs of the plaintiff, Sarah Jones, along with a note 
reading, “Nik, this is Sara J, Cincinnati Bengal Cheerleader. 
She's been spotted around town lately with the infamous 
Shayne Graham. She has also slept with every other Bengal 
Football player.”339 Richie added his own comments: “Everyone 
in Cincinnati knows this kicker is a Sex Addict.”340 Another us-
er submitted a photograph of Jones with the comment, “Her ex 
Nate.. cheated on her with over 50 girls in 4 yrs.. in that time 
he tested positive for Chlamydia Infection and Gonorrhea.. so 
im sure Sarah also has both.. whats worse is he brags about 
doing sarah in the gym.. football field.. her class room at the 
school she teaches at DIXIE Heights.”341 Richie posted these 
along with his own comment: “Why are all high school teachers 
freaks in the sack?nik.”342 There was more, but you get the pic-
ture. 
Jones repeatedly complained to Richie, who refused to re-
move the posts. Under the prevailing judicial interpretation of 
§ 230, he was clearly in the right, as the Sixth Circuit con-
firmed when Jones sued for defamation, false light, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.343 All of the offending 
posts were written by users. It did not matter that Richie add-
ed his own comments, because his own comments were not de-
famatory. If moderators were forbidden to post to their own 
sites on pain of losing their § 230 immunity, they would lose a 
powerful tool for norm-setting. It did not matter that Richie 
                                                
336  For proposals to limit Section 230, see, for example, DANIELLE KEATS CIT-
RON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 177-81 (2014); and Nancy S. Kim, Web-
site Design and Liability, 52 JURIMETRICS 383 (2012). 
337  Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th 
Cir. 2014), rev’g 965 F. Supp. 2d 818 (E.D. Ky. 2013). 
338  THE DIRTY, http://thedirty.com [http://perma.cc/9SU9-GAFB]. 
339  Jones, 755 F.3d at 403. At the time, Graham was a placekicker for the 
Bengals. 
340  Id.  
341  Id. 
342  Id. at 404. 
343  Id.  
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refused to remove the posts after being notified because § 230 
makes no distinction based on notice.344 If notice took away 
immunity, high-volume sites would be easy targets for a heck-
ler’s veto. Moderators who were unable to review notices care-
fully would simply remove any content that was the subject of a 
notice.345 
These two rationales for blanket immunity are individually 
well taken, but considered together, they contradict each other. 
Richie’s defense rests on the simultaneous claims that human 
moderation is desirable and that human moderation is impos-
sible. Both cannot be true at the same time. By individually 
commenting on the posts about Jones, Richie provided active, 
human moderation. In so doing, he showed that he is not the 
kind of moderator for whom immunity even after notice was 
designed. We know that individual review of the user-
submitted posts about Jones is feasible because Richie himself 
had already engaged in just such a review when he posted and 
commented on them. 
Section 230, then, should perhaps apply differently to au-
tomated moderation and human moderation. For automated 
moderation, immunity even after notice can potentially be jus-
tified. If a website does not already use human moderation, 
goes the argument, it should not be forced to. At the scale of a 
YouTube or a Reddit, such a mandate could be debilitating. But 
where a specific post has already been the subject of human 
moderation, the argument for immunity after notice is weaker. 
The website’s own actions show that it is capable of providing 
substantive human review. This is not an argument for going 
back to the world before § 230, in which Prodigy could be held 
liable as a publisher (liable even without notice) because it 
used human moderation. The point is narrower: websites like 
The Dirty that rely extensively on content-specific human cura-
tion could be treated as distributors (liable after notice) without 
undercutting the core rationales of § 230.346 Thus, even if 
Richie should not have been liable for the initial postings, there 
is a stronger case that he should have been liable for failing to 
remove them.347 
                                                
344 See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331-34 (4th Cir. 1997) (reject-
ing the argument that notice defeats immunity). 
345 Id. at 333. 
346 For a detailed and thoughtful discussion of those rationales, see Felix T. 
Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293 (2011). 
347 Assuming, that is, that the posts were defamatory—an assumption we 
must make when considering the threshold question of Section 230 im-
munity. 
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Not all moderation is the same. Insights like these are pos-
sible only when we delve into the details of how different com-
munities are moderated differently. 
B. Copyright Act § 512 
The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation 
Act, codified at § 512 of the Copyright Act, takes a rather dif-
ferent approach. It offers online “service provider[s]” immunity 
from copyright infringement for user-uploaded content.348 But 
unlike § 230’s blanket immunity, § 512’s is shot through with 
exceptions. The provider must “respond[] expeditiously to re-
move” material that is the subject of a notice of infringement.349 
It must also have a policy for terminating the accounts of “re-
peat infringer[s].”350 The safe harbor is suspended when the 
provider has knowledge of specific infringing activity and does 
nothing,351 or when it has both a “financial benefit directly at-
tributable to” the infringement and the “right and ability to 
control” it.352 At the same time, § 512 limits moderators’ duties 
to these specified ones. They need not “affirmatively seek[] 
facts indicating infringing activity.”353 
In moderation terms, § 512 specifies particular moderation 
strategies that a provider must use. It must use ex post deletion 
when it receives notices or knowledge of infringement, and it 
must use ex post exclusion against repeat infringers. The finan-
cial benefit test is a restriction on pricing: it rules out modera-
tion models with prices that can be too “directly” linked to in-
fringing material. The underlying assumption, in common with 
§ 230, is that infringement-screening moderation is both desir-
able and necessarily imperfect. But § 512 more realistically 
recognizes that not all moderators will voluntarily adopt the 
law’s goals—some users, and some moderators, are all for in-
fringement.  
Again, the survey of moderation shows some substantial 
wisdom in § 512’s approach. In particular, by specifying partic-
ular moderation techniques rather than requiring perfect com-
pliance or setting forth a vague standard for judicial elabora-
tion, § 512 gives moderators clear and realistic orders. 
Takedown notices and repeat-infringer suspensions are suscep-
tible to straightforward automated enforcement. The choice of 
ex post over ex ante moderation also simplifies the moderation 
task: required activity is triggered only by specific events. At 
the same time, § 512’s design also pushes moderation in some 
                                                
348  17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
349  Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
350  Id. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
351  Id. § 512(c)(1)(A). 
352  Id. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
353  Id. § 512(m)(1). 
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perhaps unintended directions. The red-flag knowledge test 
discourages moderators from looking too closely at content on 
their sites lest they become liable for knowing of infringement 
and failing to remove it—thereby discouraging hands-on mod-
eration for other considerations, such as cultivating positive 
community norms.  
Copyright owners have been frustrated by the rule that 
intermediaries have no duty to search for infringing content,354 
even though such a duty would create potentially crippling 
legal uncertainty.355 Interestingly, YouTube’s ContentID 
system now blocks uploaded videos that match an extensive list 
of copyrighted works.356 YouTube has, in effect, invented 
around  § 512’s ex ante/ex post distinction, a move that was 
feasible because of advances in computing power and content-
matching algorithms.357 This is a good example of a moderation 
technique that would be hard to mandate directly. Any court 
looking at ContentID would be hard-pressed to explain whether 
its matching algorithms were too aggressive or not aggressive 
enough in general, let alone in any specific case.358 But even 
where specific commands are unworkable, the general principle 
is reasonable. A good legal regime for moderation should find 
ways to encourage both the development of better moderation 
techniques and the deployment of ones that already exist. 
V. Conclusion 
The patterns of moderation, at once enabling and constrain-
ing, are like the basic steps of a dance. They can be combined in 
an infinite number of ways, and a skilled dancer can always 
find new and surprising variations, but the audience member 
who knows the steps can recognize how the dance brings them 
together. This Article, then, is an initial dance lesson for legal 
scholars. The grammar of moderation provides a convenient 
way to reason about online communities: it directs attention to 
significant features and makes tentative predictions about 
                                                
354  See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 667 F.3d 
1022, 1041-43 (9th Cir. 2011), withdrawn, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2011). 
355 See John Blevins, Uncertainty As Enforcement Mechanism: The New Ex-
pansion of Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1821 (2013). 
356  See generally How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE.COM, https://support.googl 
e.com/youtube/answer/2797370 [https://perma.cc/2M4M-UKGU] (describ-
ing ContentID’s automated ex ante filtering) 
357 But see Rebecca Tushnet, All of This Has Happened Before and All of This 
Will Happen Again: Innovation in Copyright Licensing, 29 BERK. TECH. 
L.J. 1447, 1457-67 (criticizing ContentID). 
358 See Sonia K. Katyal & Jason M. Schultz, The Unending Search for the 
Optimal Infringement Filter, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 83, 83-84 (2012) 
(critizing proposal to “incentiviz[e] webhosts to screen materials prior to 
posting them” by “offering immunity only for webhosts that employ the 
best available method for filtering content prior to publication”). 
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what certain forms of moderation are likely to do. The theory of 
moderation should be applicable to such matters as network 
neutrality, regulation of social software, intermediary liability, 
online privacy, and media policy. It may also be useful in de-
scribing the institutional options open to communities dealing 
with the management of offline resources. 
We should not expect so subtle a term as “moderation” to 
have only one meaning. This Article has dealt with “modera-
tion” as practiced by moderators, those who bring order to a 
discussion. But “moderation” is also a matter of being moder-
ate, “avoidance of excess or extremes in behaviour.”359 Online 
communities are caught between freedom and control, open-
ness and closure, abundance and scarcity. The theory of mod-
eration presented in this Article emphasizes that none of these 
oppositions is ever absolute. No community is ever perfectly 
open or perfectly closed; moderation always takes place some-
where in between. 
                                                
359  Moderation, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002). 
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